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ABSTRACT 
 
 
EFFECTS OF FREE RIDERS AND INCENTIVE DISCRIMINATION ON  
 
CUSTOMER ACQUISITION AND RETENTION RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
 
BY 
 
Geng Wang 
 
May 11, 2006 
 
 
Committee Chair: Thomas Whalen 
 
Major Academic Unit: Department of Managerial Sciences 
 
How should a company best allocate its spending between acquisition and retention?  
Under what condition should a company devote resources and money to analytics?  The 
above questions are just examples of more general issues concerning many companies 
when managing their customer acquisition and retention programs.  To answer the above 
questions, I will conduct a study on the allocation of financial resources between 
incentives that target different types of customers, and the allocation of resources 
between incentives and analytics spending.  This research first distinguishes between 
customers and acquisition, between incentive and price discount, and between acquisition 
and retention.  It then proposes a new concept, “free rider”, in a customer acquisition and 
retention context.  Building on the free-rider concept, two mathematical models are 
formulated to examine the optimal allocation between acquisition incentive, retention 
incentive, and analytics spending.  Closed-form solutions are reached for both models 
and the results are interpreted in the context of marketing practice.  The conditions 
leading to different patterns of optimal solutions of analytics spending, acquisition 
incentives, and retention incentives are discussed.  Specifically, the detailed conditions 
under which the optimal acquisition incentives is zero or non-zero, the optimal retention 
incentives is zero or non-zero, and the optimal analytics spending is zero or non-zero, are 
provided.  Factors determining the ceiling for acceptable level of cost of analytics are 
also examined.
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Abstract 
 
How should a company best allocate its spending between acquisition and retention?  
Under what condition should a company devote resources and money to analytics?  The 
above questions are just examples of more general issues concerning many companies 
when managing their customer acquisition and retention programs.  To answer the above 
questions, I will conduct a study on the allocation of financial resources between 
incentives that target different types of customers, and the allocation of resources 
between incentives and analytics spending.  This research first distinguishes between 
customers and acquisition, between incentive and price discount, and between acquisition 
and retention.  It then proposes a new concept, “free rider”, in a customer acquisition and 
retention context.  Building on the free-rider concept, two mathematical models are 
formulated to examine the optimal allocation between acquisition incentive, retention 
incentive, and analytics spending.  Closed-form solutions are reached for both models 
and the results are interpreted in the context of marketing practice.  The conditions 
leading to different patterns of optimal solutions of analytics spending, acquisition 
incentives, and retention incentives are discussed.  Specifically, the detailed conditions 
under which the optimal acquisition incentives is zero or non-zero, the optimal retention 
incentives is zero or non-zero, and the optimal analytics spending is zero or non-zero, are 
provided.  Factors determining the ceiling for acceptable level of cost of analytics are 
also examined.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 Background and Introduction 
 
In today’s economy, the service sector accounts for two-thirds of the GDP of the United 
States and the European Union alike.  Customer base is becoming increasingly important 
to service-oriented businesses.  Customers are recognized not only as the buyers of the 
company’s products and services, but also as assets of the companies’ (Gupta & 
Lehmann, 2003).  As a result, companies pay more and more attention to attracting and 
retaining customers in addition to selling products and services.  One of the important 
measures that companies take to accomplish the mission of attracting and retaining 
customers is to offer their prospects and customers acquisition incentives or retention 
incentives.  The ability to spend the incentive money effectively in order to minimize the 
cost or maximize the return will directly contribute to the companies’ bottom lines and 
their competitiveness. 
 
What is the “best” amount of incentives a company should offer to its prospect customers 
or existing customers in order to attract or retain them?  What factors will affect the level 
of incentive?   
 
Although many studies (Blattberg & Deighton, 1996. Berger & Nasr, 1998. Reinartz et 
al, 2005.) have been conducted in attempt of answering the above questions, none has 
examined the effects of analytics and incentive-discrimination.  Since price-
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discrimination is widely discussed in studies about consumer purchasing behavior, the 
lack of study or even the mentioning of effect of incentive-discrimination on incentive 
allocations, in this author’s view, represents a gap in the knowledge base.  At the 
conclusion of this research, I will demonstrate that this study contributes to the theory 
and managerial practice in many ways such as defining the ceiling of acceptable level of 
cost of analytics, and providing managerial directions when company’s customer base or 
competitive situation changes.  In addition, the study will also provide answer to the 
question of “Why on the one hand, retention is considered a more cost-effective means 
than acquisition; but on the other hand, companies are often criticized for spending less 
than they should on retention?”  By answering this question, a gap between the existing 
marketing theory and common marketing practice will also be bridged. 
 
Specifically, this research formulates mathematical models and examines how customer 
characteristics and the company’s ability to incentive-discriminate its customer base 
affects its optimal decision regarding the amount of acquisition incentives, retention 
incentives, and analytics spending. 
 
In the remainder of Chapter 1, to distinguish incentives from simple price discounts, a 
compare-and-contrast between incentives and price discounts, as well as between 
incentives and volume discounts, will be conducted.  In Chapter 2, a review of literature 
will be presented to provide the foundation for the model.  In Chapter 3, I will present 
the specific research questions and establish the framework for the models.  In Chapter 
4, justification for using a mathematical model is provided.  In Chapter 5 and 6, a “base 
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model” and an “extended model” will be formulated and the optimal solutions will be 
solved.  Chapter 7 will discuss the contributions of the study and propose future research 
directions. 
1.2 Incentive-Discrimination 
In this research, the effects of “incentive-discrimination” on the decisions regarding 
acquisition incentive, retention incentive, and analytics spending is examined.  In 
economics as well as in marketing, price discrimination, which refers to charging 
different customers different prices, has been broadly studied and practiced.  This 
research, however, positions itself in the context of customer acquisition and retention 
process, where customers are attracted and retained through incentives offerings.  
Similar to price discrimination, but in a customer acquisition and retention setting, the 
concept of incentive-discrimination is proposed and its effect is studied.  In this study, 
incentive-discrimination is defined as “offering acquisition and retention incentives only 
to prospects or customers who satisfy certain criteria”.   
1.3 The Nature and Functions of “Incentive” 
What constitutes an incentive?  How does an incentive differ from a price discount or a 
quantity (volume) discount?   
Although “incentive” and “discount” are often used interchangeably, it is important in the 
context of this study to clearly distinguish one from the other.  A price discount is 
usually a reduction in price that aims at increasing present or short-term demand only.   
For example, in order to sell quickly some of its groceries, a grocer cuts the prices on 
those items.  A volume discount (or quantity discount) is a type of price discount that is 
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given in the form of a reduction in unit price for high volume purchases.  For example, a 
company constructs its price schedule as such that when the higher volume is ordered, the 
unit price will decrease.  An incentive (for acquisition or retention) is a discount 
(including cash, free products, or free services) aimed at attracting or retaining customers 
and increasing long term demand.  For example, a cell phone company offers discount if 
the customer agrees to sign a one-year service contract. 
 
As I will demonstrate below, sometimes a price reduction/concession is compounded, 
meaning that it can function both as a simple price discount and as an incentive. 
Therefore, when the actual incentive amount has to be measured or the optimal incentive 
amount has to be implemented, it is important that we identify the true amount of 
incentive embedded in a price reduction/concession.  Because one of the major 
objectives of this study is to understand the determinants of optimal incentive decisions, 
without a clear distinction between an incentive and a discount, the magnitude of 
incentive will be distorted and the results will be sub-optimal. 
I will first compare and contrast between incentive and discount, incentive and volume 
discount, then I will summarize their differences from the following perspectives: 
• Strategic 
• Specific Objectives 
• Operational 
• Time Effect 
1.3.1 Incentive vs. Price Discount  
Existence of Switching Cost as a Necessary Condition for Incentives 
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In retail business, some stores have “moving sale” or “out of business sale” before they 
move or close businesses.  Also, in many markets, companies cut prices in order to 
reduce excess supplies or inventories.  The purpose of these price discounts is to 
increase the demand for the time being only.  They are simple price discounts.  The 
purpose of incentives, in contrast, is to increase the demand not only for the time being 
but also for the future periods as well. 
 
Under what conditions will a discount offered in the current period also increase the 
demand in the future periods?  Customers come back in the future because they might 
find it convenient to buy in the same store, feel more certain about the product they have 
already tried, find it troublesome to learn a new store layout, or feel unwilling to learn a 
different type of machine or operation procedure.  For example, time and effort is 
required for making phone calls and completing paperwork if a customer wants to switch 
from one wireless phone services to another.  Time and effort is also required for 
learning a different store layout if a consumer switches to a new super-market.  In 
addition to the time and effort spent, the consumer might also face the uncertainty in the 
quality of the new services or products. 
 
The time, effort, uncertainty and so on that are part of the switching process can be 
characterized as “switching costs.”  Switching costs are defined as costs incurred to a 
customer when he switches in or out from one company’s products or services to a 
competitor’s.  (More broadly, we can also regard a fresh new customer’s costs of joining 
as switching costs.)  Switching costs usually include monetary cost such as new 
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equipment, search cost such as time spent to learn about the new product or service, and a 
mental cost for people who are dislike uncertainties and risks.  Also, “Customer 
loyalty,” although not necessarily rational, can also be regarded as a type of switching 
cost.  Besides the “natural” switching costs that are inherent in the process, artificial 
switching costs can be created or imposed by the companies to deter switching-out. For 
example, early termination penalty is a type of artificial switching costs that cell phone 
companies impose. 
 
These switching costs make it more likely for customers to stay with their current product 
or service providers.  Without switching costs (monetary, or mental), a customer can 
churn freely and his future purchases will not be related to his current purchases.  
Therefore, a simple price discount without the switching cost, although increases the 
demand for the current purchase, will not affect future demand.  Once the simple price 
discount is withdrawn, its effect on demand will disappear immediately.  Therefore, the 
necessary condition for a simple price discount to become an incentive is the presence of 
switching cost.  In other words, the presence of switching cost is what distinguishes an 
incentive from a discount. 
 
Examples of Switching Cost and Incentives: Contract vs. No-contract 
 
In this section, I will demonstrate the connection between switching cost and incentives 
by examining examples of incentives with contract and incentives without contract.  The 
purpose of a contract is to create an artificial switching cost.  Therefore, contract is often 
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used to compensate for the low natural switching cost.  As the following examples will 
show, to bring repeat businesses, a contract usually accompanies the acquisition 
incentives where the natural switching cost is low. 
 
Example 1: Cell Phone - Contract 
A typical case for incentives with a contract is that of the cell phone services.   A cell 
phone service usually requires a customer to sign a one-year contract in order to receive a 
phone at discounted price or for free.  The one-year contract with early termination 
penalty is an artificially created switching-out cost.  This switching cost would deter 
people from switching carriers before the term is due. 
 
Example 2: Bank Account – No Contract 
An example for no-contract incentive is bank accounts or trading accounts.  In these 
cases, what lacks of in terms of using contracts to deter the churning of the customers is 
made up by the high “natural” switching costs.  Because of the high security and privacy 
requirements, banking functions such as account opening/account closing/transfer of 
funds/paycheck direct deposit etc. represent significant switching costs that are inherent 
in the process.  The inherent high switching cost is also enhanced by the free add-on 
services such as “Online Bill Pay,” which enables a customer to pay bills on-line and pay 
recurring bills month after month automatically.  By offering these services, an 
“artificial” switching cost is also created without using a contract.   
 
Example 3: Credit Card – No Contract 
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Another example for no-contract case is credit card.  Different from bank account, 
which has high natural switching costs, credit card has low natural switching costs.  
Because customers can churn easily (by filling up the application form that is received in 
the mail), the switching cost is usually artificially by providing airline mileages or cash 
back on purchases. 
 
To summarize, an incentive program must be accompanied either by natural switching 
costs or by creating artificial ones.  
The connection between switching cost, contract, and incentive is as follows: 
• Switching cost is a necessary condition for incentives. 
• The magnitude of the natural switching cost primarily determines whether a 
contract is necessary or not.  The higher the natural switching cost, the lower the 
need for contract. 
• Contract is a means of increasing switching cost artificially.  When an incentive 
is offered with a contract, an artificial incentive is created and attached. 
• There are other means of artificially increasing switching cost without using 
contracts, for example, free on-line bill pay services. 
• When an incentive is offered without a contract, there must be either natural 
switching cost, or other forms of artificial switching cost, or both. 
  
Summary of examples 
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The Table 1 summarizes the four commonly seen services examples of various types of 
switching costs and incentives.   
 
1.3.2 Incentive vs. Volume Discount 
There are similarities between incentives and volume discounts.  For example, in both 
cases, the overall larger total purchases will lower the unit price for the buyer.  However, 
volume discount differs from incentive in their functions. 
 
Functions and Reasons for Volume Discount 
A review of literature has found four reasons for volume discount/quantity discount: 
1. Economics: Price discrimination.  Buchanen (1953) argues that the demand schedule 
of large buyers is more elastic than the small buyers.  Therefore, discount must be 
given to these larger buyers to attract their purchases.  However, quantity discount is 
not a universal means for price discrimination – sometimes quantity surcharge is used 
instead.  For example, Cude & Walker (1984) conduct over 2,000 price comparisons 
and find that about 10% of them have quantity surcharges.  Canned tuna fish, 
laundry detergent are among the most often seen.  In these instances, the unit price 
per pound or per ounce of a larger package is actually higher than a smaller package.  
Agrawal (1993) conduct an empirical study and infer that quantity surcharges is a 
price discrimination tool aimed at large households, who have high demands, high 
storage capacities, and high searching costs.  Therefore, the price discrimination 
function of volume discount is but one specific reaction to certain customer’s 
preferences. 
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2. Economics: Economy of scale.  Some production function will result in reduced per 
unit fixed cost or reduce variable cost when the volume is higher.  Therefore, the 
economy of scale function of volume discount is a consequence of certain production 
functions. 
3. Supply Chain: Collaborative procurement, inventory coordination, lot-sizing, revenue 
sharing, vender-buyer collaboration and game, etc.   From an operations 
management/supply chain perspective, Munson et al. (1998) classifies this function of 
volume discount as “joint buyer-seller perspective.”  Therefore, this function is the 
result of an increased efficiency between the buyer’s and seller’s organizations. 
4. Marketing: Attracting buyers, etc.  Munson & Rosenblatt (1998) conduct a survey 
asking marketing managers why they offer volume/quantity discounts.  In addition 
to the common reasons of economy of scale in manufacturing and purchasing, survey 
participants replied that a volume discount is used to attract new customers.   The 
authors state that “in situations where switching suppliers is difficult or costly, some 
suppliers offer large quantity discounts to new customers. Despite the mediocre 
profits on the initial sale, more profitable subsequent sales usually follow.”  This 
function is actually customer acquisition and retention incentive.  However, this also 
indicates that the volume discount actually functions as a simple price discount except 
that some switching cost is present.  The essence of this type of volume discount is 
not the “volume” but the “discount.”   
 
Decomposition of Volume Discount 
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From the above section’s discussion, apparently, a volume discount can function as an 
incentive just as other simple price discounts.  However, since a volume discount can be 
offered for many reasons, it is important in this study to decompose any particular 
volume discount.  In other words, since the amount of incentive is of the primary 
interest to this study, it is important to know whether the volume discount is given 
because of price discrimination, economy of scale, supply chain efficiency, or an 
acquisition/retention incentive.  It is also important to realize that not all quantity 
discounts function as incentives unless they are accompanied by switching costs. 
 
If a volume discount is serving multiple functions, it can be decomposed of the following 
four components: discrimination, economy of scale, supply-chain effectiveness, and 
incentive as shown below: 
Total Volume Discount 
=Amount for discrimination + Amount for economy of scale + Amount for Supply Chain 
efficiency + Amount for incentives  
 
Although in reality, it is difficult to separate the four components and allocate precisely 
the correct proportions to each function, one can at least qualitatively understand that 
only a proportion of the amount of volume discount offered should be regarded as 
incentive.  To illustrate, I categorize volume discount into the following three scenarios: 
• When a volume discount is not an incentive.  If a volume discount is largely due 
to the reasons of, for example, economy of scale, then treating it entirely as an 
incentive will make the incentives larger than it actually is.  Since the necessary 
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condition for a discount to become an incentive is the existence of switching cost, 
when there is no switching cost, a volume discount will just be a discount, not an 
incentive. 
 
• When a volume discount is a mixture of many functions.  This is the most 
common case.  It is when there are both switching cost and other reasons such as 
economy of scale. As discussed above, there are four main reasons for providing 
volume discount.  And sometimes these various reasons can be present in a 
single offer of volume discount.  For example, a quantity discount can be offered 
because of the firm’s economy-of-scale, its intent to price-discriminate, and the 
switching costs.  In this case, the true magnitude of incentive is less than the 
total discount. 
 
• When a volume discount is entirely an incentive.  When there is no economy of 
scale, or discrimination, or supply chain efficiency, a volume discount offered to a 
customer is entirely an acquisition/retention incentive.  In this case, a volume 
discount is a “pure” acquisition/retention incentive.   
 
Volume Discount vs. Incentive: A multiple-time-period perspective  
 
From the time perspective, volume discount often aims at increased order quantity while 
retention aims at increased length of relationship.  For example, if the annual demand of 
a particular customer is a fixed amount, then volume discount would increase demand per 
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order and decrease the number of orders, while the retention incentives will increase the 
number of years the customer stays with the company. 
 
For example, a volume discount will increase the demand from p to p+q (q>0) in the 
current period; an incentive will maintain the current period demand at p, but increase the 
number of period that the customer is with the company from n to n+m (m>0).  In a 
multi-period framework, this will result in an increase in the demand of the future periods. 
  
1.3.3 Strategic Differences between Incentives and Discounts 
 
In addition to switching cost, there are other differences between incentives and price 
discounts.  These differences can be attributed to different corporate strategies, i.e., 
Customer-centric vs. Product-centric. 
 
Different from a traditional product-centric business, which focuses on product sales, a 
customer-centric business emphasizes on the following key characteristics of customer 
relations: 
• A customer usually makes a stream of purchases instead of one.  The product-
centric approach does not take this into account. 
• The probability that a customer makes his next purchase is dependent on his past 
purchases.  The product-centric approach does not capture this aspect. 
• The product-centric approach does not consider the issue of switching cost. 
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• For a customer-centric business, the corporate structure is often formed around 
customers instead of products.  For example, Fidelity Personal Investments 
structured the corporation around customer segments such as “accounts with more 
than $500,000,” “active traders,” and “retirees,” etc.  Product managers report to 
the segment CEOs. (Selden, L. & Colvin, G. 2003) 
 
Therefore, the differences between offering a customer goods or services at discounted 
prices and offering him acquisition/retention incentives can be viewed from the following 
perspectives: 
• Strategic: Discount is usually a tool for executing product-centered strategy while 
incentive is for customer-centered strategy. The subject in price discount is the 
products/services; whereas in acquisition/retention incentives, it is the customers. 
• Objectives: The primary purpose for most price discounts is to increase demand.  
The purpose for incentives, however, is to attract or retain customers. 
• Operational: Price discounts are usually not targeted towards a specific group of 
customer, and are often publicized.  The incentives are usually targeted to certain 
groups of customers and sometimes are kept confidential. 
• Outcomes: The outcome of the price discount is measured by the quantity of 
products/services sold.  The outcome of the incentives is the number of 
customers acquired or retained. 
• Time frames: Price discount can be regarded as a one-time transaction, whereas 
incentives bring a stream of transactions.  The evaluation of the effect of 
incentives is usually in a multi-period context.   
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1.3.4 Summary 
The main difference between a non-incentive price discount (including volume discount) 
and an acquisition/retention incentive is summarized in Table 2. 
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
 
This review of literature examines the relevant views and evidences relating to the issues 
in customer acquisition and retention.  
2.1 Customer Satisfaction, Loyalty, and Retention 
2.1.1 Is a satisfied customer necessarily a loyal customer? 
The importance of customer satisfaction has been heralded for decades, if not longer.  
The saying “customer is always right” exemplifies the emphasis on customer service and 
customer satisfaction.  By increasing customer satisfaction, the companies hope to 
achieve customer loyalty because a loyal customer will even overlook the flaws of the 
company, therefore giving the company competitive advantages over its competitors.  As 
Oliver (1999) puts it: 
When a consumer voluntarily removes him- or herself from competitive overtures, 
effectively tuning out persuasive arguments to switch, he or she achieved a state 
not unlike the concept of love. 
So, if satisfied customers are loyal customers and loyal customers bring more profits to 
the company in the long run, then why do not companies make all of their customers 
satisfied by offering, for example, every customer acquisition and retention incentives?  
 
Firstly, loyalty might be very costly to achieve and is not always attainable.  Jones et al. 
(1995) find that “true long-term loyalty” is only achieved when customers are 
“completely satisfied”.  Customers who are less than “completely satisfied” will defect 
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easily when opportunities present.  Oliver (1999) concludes that depending on the nature 
of the product or the segment of consumers, loyalty is not attainable by many firms.  
Therefore, many companies have to settle for various degrees of customer satisfaction, 
instead of customer loyalty. 
 
Secondly, even complete satisfaction does not guarantee loyalty.  In a study regarding 
the relationship between customer satisfaction and customer loyalty, Jones and Sasser 
(1995) characterize four types of customers based on their satisfaction and loyalty 
relations.  The two types that have positive relations between satisfaction and loyalty 
are: the “loyalists”, who are high on satisfaction and high on loyalty; and the “defectors”, 
who are low on both satisfaction and loyalty.  Interestingly, there are two types that do 
not have positive relations between satisfaction and loyalty.  They are the “mercenaries” 
and the “hostages.”  “Mercenaries” are those who have high satisfaction level but low to 
medium loyalty level; and “hostages” are those who are low on satisfaction but high on 
loyalty.   
 
Lee et al (2001) provide explanation on why some customers are low on satisfaction but 
high on loyalty.  They find that switching costs play an important role in moderating the 
relationship between customer satisfaction and loyalty.  The weak link between 
satisfaction and loyalty happens when the switching cost is high.  Because high 
switching costs deter unsatisfied customers from defecting, the unsatisfied customers 
appear to be “loyal”.  Oliver (1999) argues that although satisfaction is a necessary 
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condition for loyalty, there are other mechanisms such as personal fortitude and social 
bonding that contribute to the loyalty.   
 
As Simon (1955, 1972) proposes in his study about “bounded rationality” that humans 
are subject to the cognitive limitations and therefore often make decisions that are not 
rational.  Customer loyalty clearly contains such non-rational components.  For 
example, some loyal customers of Ford choose Ford automobiles not because they have 
rationally evaluated the choices but because their fathers and grandfathers all drove Ford 
automobiles. 
 
Based on the above review, we can conclude that acquisition and retention incentive play 
a role in customer’s “rational” switching decision process, except for the most “loyal” 
customers.  The current study positions itself by examining only the rational aspect of 
customer switching.  Specifically, in this study, it is assumed that all customers make 
their decision by evaluating the amount of switching cost and the incentive offered to 
them.   Therefore, by manipulating the acquisition and retention incentive offering, a 
customer can be affected in his switching decision. 
 
2.2  Valuing Customers  
Recent studies hold the view that customer base is the assets of a company and its value 
can be assessed quantitatively.  For example, Gupta & Lehmann (2003) quantitatively 
link a company’s customer base to its profitability and its financial valuation.  In their 
study, they estimate that the average value of an E*Trade customer is about $960.  
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Models that calculate customer values have been employed to direct the practice of 
customer acquisition and retention.  For example, in marketing applications, Customer 
Lifetime Value (CLV or LTV), can be used to assist customer acquisition and retention 
decisions (Dwyer, 1989).  It is often used as the objective function of an 
acquisition/retention effort.  Lifetime value of a customer is the present value of future 
stream of costs that this customer incurs and incomes this customer brings.  If we denote 
the profit margin that a customer generates during a specific period t as mt, then the life-
time value of the customer (LTV), with a discount rate of i, and a constant retention rate 
of r, is given by the following formula (Gupta, 2003):  
∑∞
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The emphasis of LTV formulation is on the multi-period perspective of customer cost 
and revenue stream.  The unit of analysis in LTV formulation is individual customers or 
cohorts of customers.  However, since the current study is primarily concerned with the 
allocation between acquisition incentive and retention incentives, and the goal is to solve 
for the optimal allocation between acquisition and retention incentive in any given single 
time period, I will not use a multi-period framework as the LTV.  Nevertheless, the 
current model is consistent with the LTV formulation and the proof is provided in 
Appendix I. 
2.3 Switching Cost Distribution 
2.3.1 Switching Cost Distribution 
Switching cost is one of the important factors in customer switching decision.  Switching 
costs vary among different customers.  Epling (2002) presents the empirical evidence of 
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heterogeneous switching costs among customers in the telecommunications industry.  
Although switching cost cannot always be observed directly, it can be estimated through 
other observable variables such as the number of switches within a certain period of time 
(Epling, 2002). 
 
In switching decision process, a “rational” consumer evaluates between the option of 
switching and not switching in a similar fashion as he evaluates between the options of 
buying and not buying in a typical purchasing decision.  The only difference is that in a 
typical purchase, the consumer makes comparison between his reservation price and the 
product price while in a switching decision the consumer compares his switching cost 
(including the future switch-out cost) with the incentive and the benefit of switching.  
Therefore, previous literature on consumer reservation price distributions provides 
reasonable indication of switching cost distribution.   
 
Many studies assume uniform distribution for reservation prices of consumers 
(Venkatesh, R. & Kamakura, W. 2003; McGuire, T., and Staelin, R. 1983.).  Shifted 
exponential distribution, which is composed of a constant plus an exponential random 
variable, is also examined (Lin, 2004).  Since the demand function is a cumulative 
function of the reservation price, a uniform distribution of the customer reservation prices 
corresponds to a linear demand function of price.  By using a linear demand function 
with an intercept, Pollak (1976) also implicitly applies a uniform distribution in his study.  
For the analyses in this study, I choose a uniform distribution for switching cost. 
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2.4 Price Discrimination/Targetability/Incentive Discrimination 
Because the reservation prices vary from one customer to the next, the ability to identify 
each customer’s reservation price will enable the firms to better price-discriminate.  The 
term “price discrimination”, meaning charging different prices to different buyers (Frank, 
R.H. 1994), is seen widely in economics literatures.  In marketing literatures, terms such 
as “customer differentiation” and “targetability” are also used.  For example, Pelham 
(1997) uses the term “customer differentiation” to describe a firm’s ability to separate 
groups of customers whose buying needs and motives are different.  Chen et al (2001) 
defines “targetability” as a firm’s ability to predict the preferences and behaviors of 
customers for the purpose of customizing price or product offers. 
 
The effects of price-discrimination or targetability have been studied primarily in a 
setting of competitive firms.  Chen et al (2001) examine the consequences of firms’ 
increased targetability on competing firms’ strategies.  They show that in a two-firm 
competitive market setting, the improvement in targetability can increase not only the 
firm’s own profitability but also the competition’s profitability.  
 
Although discrimination has been studies previously, the primary focus of those studies is 
the product purchasing process, instead of acquisition and retention process.  For this 
study, I will introduce the term “incentive-discrimination” to describe a company’s 
ability to identify prospect or customers with different switching cost and offer 
acquisition incentives or retention incentives selectively as the result of such ability. 
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Continuous Model vs. Discrete Model in Predicting Switching or Response 
In practice, the prediction about customers’ preferences (or switching costs) is achieved 
through predictive modeling, which analyzes customer demographic, geographic, and 
purchase information and provides predictions.  Many analytical tool such as logistic 
regression, neural networks, and genetic algorithms have been used in predictive 
modeling.  Under the ideal situation, when the prediction is about customers’ switching 
costs, a model that provides the detailed customer switching cost is better than a model 
that only predicts “high” and “low”.  However, Bodapati & Gupta (2004) demonstrated 
that when the information about prospects or customers is limited, the discretized model, 
which applies binary dependent variable such as response vs. no-response, performs 
better than a continuous model, which uses continuous dependent variable (household 
spending in dollars).  This is because when the predictive models are statistically biased 
due to the quality of data and the limited availability of information, as it is very often the 
case in marketing and consumer purchasing data, the binary model helps lowering the 
bias and produces better predictions.   
 
Based on the above review, in the current study, I will define the outcome of the analytics 
as the identification of a free rider or not (discrete), instead of his or her switching cost 
(continuous).    
2.5 Optimizing Acquisition and Retention Spending 
Since a dollar can be spent toward either acquiring a prospect or retaining a customer, 
this leads to the question of “How much money should be spent on acquisition incentives 
vs. retention incentive so that the cost of acquisition and retention is minimized?” 
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Blattberg & Deighton (1996) present a method of calculating optimal level of acquisition 
spending and retention spending.  In their study, they assume that the acquisition rate is 
an exponential function of acquisition spending.  After the function’s parameters are 
estimated, and the margin per customer is known, the optimal level of acquisition 
spending can be calculated.  The same process is applied to the calculation of the 
optimal retention spending.  Their research examines the acquisition and retention 
separately but does not investigate the combined effects between acquisition incentive 
and retention incentive.  
 
Berger & Nasr (1998) extend the above method by providing a nonlinear programming 
based solution to the optimal allocation between acquisition spending and retention 
spending.  In the above study, however, the acquisition rate or the number of customers 
acquired is a function of acquisition incentive only.  They do not include the ability to 
incentive-discriminate into the model, nor do they examine the effect of different 
customer switching cost distributions. 
 
The optimal allocation between acquisition and retention resources has also been studied 
empirically.  Reinartz et al (2005) use statistical model to estimate the parameters in 
their model and perform simulation analyses.  However, in their model, the effects of 
incentive-discrimination is not studied. 
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2.6 Commonly Observed Level of Acquisition Rate and Retention Rate 
The acquisition rate and retention rate can vary greatly between different industries, 
products, and services.     
 
On retention rate, Clark (1997) uses two branches of a major retail bank in UK.  The 
customer retention rate ranged from 60% to 75%.  However, the study fails to specify 
the length of time period on which the retention rate is measured.  Reichheld (1996) 
estimates that a typical company has customer defection rate of 10% to 30%, or retention 
rate of 70% to 90% annually.  Gupta and Lehmann (2003) report the annual retention 
rate of several companies: CDNow, an internet startup company, 51%-68%; Capital One, 
85%; AT&T, estimated at 81%; Ameritrade, an internet trading company, 94%-95%. 
 
On acquisition rate, Birkin & Clarke (1998) report that direct mailing’s response rate 
ranged from 1% in random mailing to 5% - 10% for mailings with geographic and/or 
demographic targeting. Schlegelmilch & Woodruffe (1995) cite a bank vice president as 
saying that the response rate for affinity credit card are normally around 2%, but could be 
as high as 5% to 7% for each round of solicitation. 
2.7 Summary 
The “ideal” solution to the problem of customer acquisition and retention is to attract or 
create “loyal” customers who “love” (Oliver, 1999) the product, the service, or the 
company.  However, in many product or service markets, either satisfaction does not 
guarantee loyalty, or loyalty is not attainable at all.  In these markets, facing the mostly 
“rational” customers who make switching decisions based on the evaluation of switching 
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cost and benefit, a company must employ incentives as means to acquire and retain 
customers.  The effectiveness of such incentives will contribute directly to the 
profitability of the company.  Although studies have been conducted in the area of price 
discrimination and the area of optimal incentive allocation, none was focused on the 
effects of incentive-discrimination on optimal incentive allocation in a customer 
acquisition and retention setting.  
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Chapter 3: Research Questions, and Model Framework 
3.1 Motivation 
In previous studies about optimal acquisition and retention spending (Blattberg & 
Deighton, 1996. Berger & Nasr, 1998.), acquisition or retention rate at a certain 
acquisition or retention spending level is treated as exogenous variable or “given”.  In 
those models, an incentive budget of $5million would correspond to, for example, an 
acquisition rate of 3%.  So, in those studies, acquisition rate or retention rate is treated as 
a function of incentive spending only.   
 
However, the situation is different in the real business world.  For example, direct 
marketing companies have been utilizing “predictive modeling” techniques to predict the 
response or non-response of prospects and send out offers selectively in order to achieve 
a better response or acquisition rate.  This indicates that acquisition rate is not only a 
function of incentive spending but also a function of the ability to identify different 
prospects’ different reactions to incentives.   
 
Therefore, in this study, acquisition rate is regarded not only as a function of acquisition 
spending but also as a function of ability to differentiate customers, or in the context of 
this research, the ability to incentive-discriminate.  In addition, since a company can 
choose to increase its level of spending in “predictive modeling” or “analytics” to 
improve the ability to incentive-discriminate, this ability becomes a function of analytics 
spending.  From a company decision maker’s point of view, to improve the acquisition 
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rate, the company can spend money on both the incentives, which attracts prospects to 
become customers, and the analytics, which allows the company to target the incentives 
to certain customers.  The question is: how much to spend on each of the above two 
items? 
 
Also, there are seemingly contradictions between theory and practice.  For example, the 
prevailing notion in CRM about customer acquisition and retention is that it costs 5 to 10 
times more to acquire a new customer than to retain an existing customer.  Despite this 
common knowledge, many companies are still characterized as “not spending enough” on 
retention.   
  
In summary, this study seeks to answer the following questions:  
• Given a customer pool and distributions of customer switching costs, what will be 
the optimal allocation of acquisition incentive spending vs. retention incentive 
spending vs. analytics spending, so that the total cost of the above three is 
minimized? 
• Under what conditions there will be such situation that any combination of the 
following is true: the optimal acquisition incentive is zero (or non-zero), the 
optimal retention incentive is zero (or non-zero), and the optimal analytics 
spending is zero (or non-zero)? 
• Also, practically, why is there a gap between the theoretical expectation of 
allocating more money on retention, and the observed behavior in practice that 
companies are not spending enough on retention?  Does this mean it would be 
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cost-efficient for a company to allocate more of its resources to retention than to 
acquisition?  
 
To summarize, what separates this research from the previous ones is that in this 
research, acquisition rate is not only a function of incentive amount, but also a function of 
ability to incentive-discriminate.  In addition, the ability to incentive-discriminate is a 
function of analytics spending.  The result of this research will help the marketing 
decision makers to optimally balance the resources between incentives and analytics 
spending. 
3.2 Model Framework 
In this section, the setting in which the model on acquisition and retention incentives is 
operated is established.  Types of switching costs are examined and a time-based 
definition of acquisition and retention is proposed.  The following terms will be defined 
or discussed: 
• Switching cost 
• Distinction between acquisition and retention 
• Conditions for Acquisition and Retention 
3.2.1 Switching Costs 
Types of Switching Costs 
Natural Switching Cost and Artificial Switching Cost 
Based on whether they can be controlled or manipulated by a company in the short run, 
switching costs can be put into two categories.  The “natural” switching cost is a 
 29
function of technology and customer’s individual preferences, etc.  The “artificial” or 
“contractual” switching cost (Klemperer, 1987) is usually controllable by the company 
through, for instance, contracts and early termination penalties.  The significance of this 
categorization to the current study is that a company can use the following two means to 
influence the customers’ switching decisions: 
1) Control the artificial switching costs. 
2) Predict prospects/customers’ natural switching costs and act accordingly 
(incentive discrimination). 
Switching-in Cost vs. Switching-out Cost 
A switching-in cost is a switching cost that is incurred to a prospect when he becomes a 
customer of the company.  The natural switching-in costs are, for example, costs of 
learning the new store layouts, learning the operation of new machines, and filling the 
account application, etc.  The artificial switching-in cost may include initiation fees a 
health club charges, for example. 
A switching-out cost is a switching cost to the customer if he defects.  Money, time, and 
efforts spent on learning the layout of a competitor’s store and the operation of a 
competitor’s machines are natural switching-out costs.  Early termination penalty is a 
typical example of an artificial switching-out cost. 
Types of Customers and Their Related Switching Costs 
The magnitude of switching-in cost is associated with the status of the prospect.  A 
competitors customer usually has higher switching-in cost than an at-large prospect. 
The three types of customers are different in their switching cost characteristics as listed 
in Table 3. 
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3.2.2 Acquisition and Retention 
Switching-Cost-Based Definition of Acquisition and Retention 
Acquisition 
In the current study, in addition to the apparent condition that an acquisition is when a 
non-customer becomes a customer of the company, the following criterion must also be 
met for a customer to become an acquisition: 
 There is a significant switching cost present or created. 
This criterion ensures that an “acquired” customer is more than just a person who bought 
some products or services from the company.  As discussed in Chapter 1, one critical 
justification for offering incentive (instead of simple price discount) is the existence or 
creation of switching cost.  Based on this criterion, a person who stops by a grocery store 
to get a snack on his long-distance drive across the country is only a customer, but not an 
acquisition because there is no switching cost involved.  In other words, since this 
customer will stop at almost any other store for his next stop freely and without any 
burdens (of switching cost), he is not an acquisition. 
 
How large does the switching cost have to be to qualify for being “significant”?  
Quantitatively, we can use the ratio between switching cost and per-period revenue or 
profit to gauge how “significant” the switching cost is.  For example, if a one-year cell 
phone contract comes with a $50 incentive and $150 early termination penalty, and the 
average profit per month is $30, assuming no “natural” switching costs, then the ratio is 
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(150-50)/30=3.3.  Therefore, one can define a switching-cost-to-profit-margin ratio of, 
for example, 2 or higher as being a “significant” switching cost. 
 
Retention  
Retention is similarly defined as keeping an existing customer while creating or 
maintaining a significant switching cost.  The difference between retention and 
acquisition is that when a prospect accepts an acquisition incentive, his net switching-in 
cost is lowers; when a customer accepts a retention incentive, his net switching-out cost 
is raised. 
 
Time-based Definition of Acquisition and Retention 
Sometimes the line between acquisition and retention is rather vague.  For example, in 
the following case:  
Pricing for Wireless Phones with Different Length of Contract  
Term of the 
Contract 
No contract One-year 
contract 
Two-year 
contract 
Phone Pricing $344 $294 $219 
  
We can see that a one-year contract will have a saving of $50 over a no-contract plan, and 
a two-year contract will save $125 over a no-contract plan.  As shown in the above 
example, different plans (no contract, one-year, or two-year) provide different amount of 
incentives.  The longer the term, the higher the incentive is.  How do we distinguish 
between an incentive that keeps the customer for one year and one that keeps the 
customer for two years?  Are they both acquisition incentives?  How should we evaluate 
between incentives that have different duration of impact? 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, switching cost is a necessary condition for offering incentives.  
In addition, I have also reasoned that a significant switching cost is a necessary condition 
for an acquisition.  In this section, I will further develop the understanding of acquisition 
and retention and will form a time-based definition.  The essence of time-based 
definition is still built on the switching-cost-based except that it emphasizes the time 
effect of switching cost.  The rationale is that a significant switching cost often results in 
the customer’s staying for a significant length of time.  Put it differently, a significant 
switching cost will increase the probability that a customer will stay for a longer period 
of time.  There can be two ways for the switching cost to prevent the customer from 
defecting too early.  One is the natural switching cost: a customer simply will incur a lot 
of these costs if he switches frequently.  The other is certain costs the company imposes, 
such as early termination penalty.  Both types of the costs discourage customers from 
switching too early or too often.  Because of the connection between switching cost and 
the expected length of stay, a time-based definition of acquisition and retention is actually 
an extension of the switching-cost-based definition.   
 
Based on the above reasoning, the switching-cost-based definition of acquisition and 
retention can be extended as: 
Acquisition is when a non-customer becomes a customer with a significant switching-out 
cost attached and this switching-out cost usually prevents the new customer from 
defecting before completing a stay of a significant length of time. 
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Retention is keeping an existing customer with a significant switching-out cost and this 
switching-out cost usually prevents the existing customer from defecting before 
completing a stay of a significant length of time. 
 
In the example above, a one-year contract will save the consumer $50, and a two-year 
contract will save $125.  So some people might think both the $50 and the $125 are 
acquisition incentives.  However, the $125 is actually a retention incentive as well.  
Using the time-based definition, we can distinguish between acquisition incentives and 
retention incentives under these situations.   
 
As discussed earlier, a necessary condition for a price discount to become an acquisition 
or retention incentive is the existence of a significant switching cost.  For a 1-year 
contract, the $50 incentive is the acquisition incentive because it creates a significant 
switching cost in the form of an early-termination penalty and therefore raises the 
probability that customers will join and stay for one year.  
 
Is the $125 incentive for a 2-year contract also an acquisition incentive?  This question 
can be answered by comparing a one-year contract with a two-year contract.  A two-year 
contract can be treated as a one-year contract offered to a new customer followed by a 
one-year contract offered to an existing customer.  Therefore, the incentives 
accompanying a two-year contract is a mixture of acquisition incentive and retention 
incentive.  From a time-based perspective, if we define a “significant length of time” as 
one year, then the completion of a one-year period is considered a successful acquisition 
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and any time period past one year should be regarded as retention.  Therefore, the $125 
is a mixed incentive that contains an acquisition incentive of $50 and a “pre-installed” 
retention incentive of $75.  The $75 is a retention incentive because it raises the 
probability that customers will stay for an additional year after the first year is completed.  
(This is also an example of the difference between the time when incentives are 
administered and the time when incentives take effect.  Specifically, in this case, the 
function of retention of the second year is actually performed when the acquisition is 
made.) 
 
If one fails to recognize that an incentive on a two-year contract is actually composed of 
more retention incentive than acquisition incentive ($75 vs. $50) instead of only 
acquisition incentive ($125), he may mistakenly believe that the company spends more 
money on acquisition than retention.  When retention cost is mistaken as acquisition 
cost, it will also add unjustified support to the notion of “companies spend more money 
on acquisition than retention”.    
 
To summarize, for contract of longer periods, by identifying the effects of incentives 
based on the “time-based” approach, one can distinguish retention incentives from 
acquisition incentives. 
3.2.3 Conditions for Switching 
In this section, the variables and the criteria for accomplishing acquisitions and retentions 
are stated.  The goal is to establish a logical and quantitative link between switching 
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cost, switching cost distributions, incentives offered, and the outcomes of incentives, i.e., 
whether the customer is acquired/retained or not.  
 
Reasons for Differences in Switching Cost among Different Individuals 
Differences in consumer preferences will affect the way a customer evaluates a 
product/service and its values.  Besides the differences in preferences about the products 
and services themselves, different risk tolerance and time discount also contribute to the 
differences in switching cost.  For example, people with high risk tolerance would 
perceive the switching to a new product or seller less risky and have lower switching cost 
than people with low risk tolerance.  Also, people who have higher time discount rates 
will perceive incentives are more valuable than those with low time discount rates.   
Therefore, the differences in switching cost among different individuals can be 
summarized as the differences in their respective “risk-adjusted net present values”.  
 
Conditions for Accomplishing Acquisition and Retention 
Conditions for Acquisition of Competitors’ Customers 
Assuming that both the firm and its competitors offer identical services or products, the 
acquisition of a competitor’s customer will be accomplished if net switching cost is less 
than zero, or equivalently, the acquisition incentive is larger than his switching cost.  
(The switching cost used in this research refers to the net switching cost after adjusted for 
any benefit but before applying the incentives.  This will allow fair comparison when 
there is difference in quality or features between two firms’ services or product.  The 
difference can be expressed as a money-equivalent and be accounted into the calculation 
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of total switching cost.  For example, in their study about wireless customer switching 
behavior, Shi et al (2002) demonstrates that larger networks offers more benefit than 
smaller networks by virtue of higher possibility of in-network calls.  If in this case, the 
direct monetary value of the switching cost without accounting for the differences in 
network size is $100 and the new company’s larger network is equivalent to $30, then the 
net switching cost is $100-$30=$70.) 
Therefore, for competitors’ customers: 
 If acquisition incentive > switching cost, then the customer is acquired. 
 
Conditions for Acquisition of At-large Customers  
Since at-large customers are not current users of a service or a product, switching cost 
will be defined as the perceived differences between the firm and its competitor.  For 
example, if for the same price, the customer perceives firm A and B as offering values of 
$200 and $150 respectively, then the “switching cost” for becoming B’s customer is $50.  
Therefore, an incentive of $50 or more from firm B is necessary to attract this customer.   
So, for at-large customers: 
 If acquisition incentive > switching cost, then the customer is acquired. 
 
Conditions for Retention of Existing Customers 
The purpose of retention incentives can be regarded as increasing effectively the total 
cost of switching.  For example, if the switching cost (without retention incentives) is 
$100 and the benefit the competitor’s offering is $120, then the customer has a negative 
net switching cost (or positive switching benefit) of $20 and will defect.  However, if a 
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$50 retention incentive is provided, then it more than offsets the switching benefit, 
making switching unattractive.  In fact, the minimum incentive necessary to retain the 
customer is: Benefits form the Competitor – Switching Cost = $120 - $100 = $20.   
Therefore, for existing customers: 
 If retention incentive> net switching benefit, then the customer is retained. 
 
“Number Acquired” and “Number Retained”  
The number of prospects acquired is a function of acquisition incentives.  The higher the 
acquisition incentive (per person) is, the higher the number of prospect customers can be 
attracted.  In most of the previous studies, s-shaped curve functions are used to describe 
acquisition rate (number acquired divided by total number of prospects). However, if 
customer switching cost function can be described as a known distribution, e.g., normal 
or uniform, and the parameters of the distributions are known (or assumed, as in this 
study), then the acquisition rate function can be derived directly as cumulative 
distribution of the switching cost function.  For instance, when the preference 
distribution is a normal curve, its corresponding cumulative distribution function (cdf) is 
an s-shaped curve.  When the preference follows a uniform distribution, the cdf, and the 
acquisition rate function is a straight line with an up-ward slope. 
 
(In addition to the amount of incentives, there are other factors affecting a particular 
consumer’s switching/staying decisions.  For example, Feinberg et al (2002) argue that 
consumers’ reaction to firm’s promotional offers is affected not only by the offer the 
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consumers themselves receive but also the offers available to others.  In this study, I will 
assume that this effect be negligible.) 
 
Example 
This example will illustrate how customer preferences and the amount of incentive 
offered determine the acquisition rate. 
Assuming everything else being constant, customers’ switching cost distribution is 
determined by their preferences.  If we know the preference distribution and 
consequently the switching cost distribution, then we can calculate the acquisition rate 
given the amount of incentives offered.  For example, if there are 10 customers, and their 
switching costs are $1, $2, … $10 respectively, then the switching cost distribution is 
known.  And if the company’s incentive offering is $8 per person, then by applying the 
acquisition condition: “If acquisition incentive > switching cost, then the customer is 
acquired”, we can see that eight customers, those whose switching cost are less than or 
equal to $8, will be acquired.  Therefore the acquisition rate is 8/10=80%.  
Mathematically, if we express the switching cost distribution as F, then the acquisition 
rate is the cumulative distribution of F divided by the total number of customers.  
 
3.2.4 Time Periods 
In this section, time period for the administration of the incentives and the time period for 
the effects of the incentives are distinguished. 
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Time Period for The Actions of Giving Acquisition/Retention Incentives 
Incentives can be administered on either a continuous basis or a discrete basis.  
Regardless of which format it takes, in this study, the amount of incentive is defined as 
the aggregated sum of incentives in a given period of time.  For example, when the 
incentive amount is needed for evaluating/comparing the effectiveness of acquisition 
incentives and retention incentives, one can use one month (or one quarter, etc) as the 
time frame for aggregating incentives. 
 
Time Period for the Effects of Acquisition/Retention 
Sometimes the duration of the effects of acquisition/retention is very close to the duration 
that incentives are administered.  For example, many credit cards accrue bonus points on 
a monthly basis continuously and the effects of retention can be regarded as extending the 
tenure month-by-month.  However, the effects of acquisition/retention do not necessarily 
match the length of time the incentive is administered.  For example, in a marketing 
campaign of one week, a one-time incentive provided on a cell phone service contract 
can effectively retain the customer for an additional year. 
 
Time Periods in the Current Study 
Without losing its generality, a shorter length of time period for administrating incentive 
and a longer one for the effects of incentives are used respectively.  Specifically, I will 
choose to use a period of one month as the length of time for incentives administration, 
i.e., both the acquisition incentives and the retention incentives, are calculated or 
aggregated respectively on a monthly basis.  I will then choose to use a period of one 
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year as the length of time for the effects of acquisition and retention, i.e., a customer 
acquired or retained is defined as a customer who will at least stay with the company for 
one year or one additional year. 
To summarize, in this study, the acquisition incentive is the cumulative amount of 
acquisition incentives that is administered in a month and it raises the probability of non-
customers joining and staying for one year. 
The retention incentive is the cumulative amount administered in a month and it raises 
the probability of existing customers staying for another year. 
 
3.2.5 Summary of the Model Framework 
To facilitate a clear understanding of the terms used in this study, a table of definition is 
provided in Table 4.  As discussed in the above paragraph, I will use one month as the 
time period on which the administration of the incentives is measured. 
  
One-time Customer vs. Acquisition vs. Retention 
The distinction between a customer, acquisition, and retention is summarized as follows: 
• A one-time customer is NOT an acquisition. 
• An acquisition is achieved when a prospect becomes a customer and a significant 
switching-out cost (natural or artificial) is accompanied.  As a result of this 
switching cost, the probability that customer will stay for at least a minimum 
length of time with the company is raised. 
• A retention is achieved when an existing customer extends his tenure with the 
company and a significant switching-out cost is accompanied. 
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• Retention incentives can be offered to prospects as well.  For an incentive offered 
to a prospect, if the accompanying contract imposes more than the minimum 
length of time requirement that qualifies it as an acquisition, then it is a mixed 
incentive, meaning that one part of it is acquisition incentive and the other part of 
it is retention incentive.    
 
The advantages of the “time-based definition” of acquisition and retention  
• Prevents certain “pre-paid” retention cost from being mis-labeled and mis-
categorized as acquisition cost.  This can clarify some of the confusions that 
result in claiming that more money is spent on acquisition than retention. 
• Provides a method of cost accounting that truly reflects the true effects of the 
acquisition incentives vs. that of retention incentives. 
• Provides a tool to decompose mixed incentives and compare incentives of 
different effective durations.  
 
Summary of Model Framework 
• A customer’s decision of whether to switch is dependent on the level of his 
switching cost and the level of incentives. 
• There are two types of switching costs: natural and artificial. 
• The level of natural switching cost is a function of the technology, regulation, 
customer’s preferences, etc.  The natural switching cost is usually not 
controllable by the firm in the short run, or, at least, not controllable by the 
marketing function of the firm. 
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• The natural switching costs vary among customers or prospects. 
• The level of artificial switching cost is mainly controllable by the firm. 
• A prospect will be acquired if the incentive offered is no less than his switching 
cost. 
• An existing customer is retained if the incentive offered is no less than his 
switching benefit. 
• Customer acquisition rate is a function of customer preference distribution 
(therefore the switching cost distribution) and the incentive level per customer. 
 
This framework is illustrated as Figure 1. 
 
The firm can influence customer’s switching decision by controlling or managing 
incentives and artificial switching cost, as well as predicting customer’s preferences. 
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3.3 Free Riders 
3.3.1 Definition and Examples of Free Riders 
In the last section, I illustrated the effects of ability to incentive-discriminate customers 
on acquisition and retention incentives allocation.  A natural follow-up question will be 
“Under what circumstances is it optimal to offer acquisition incentives, retention 
incentives, or both?”  In addition, “Given a certain level of ability to discriminate its 
prospect customers and a certain level of ability to discriminate its existing customers 
respectively, what will be the optimal acquisition incentive amount and retention 
incentive amount?”  To answer the above questions, in this section, I will first introduce 
the concept of “Free Riders” in acquisition and retention process.   
 
Background and Definition 
In economics, the term “free rider” with respect to public goods or collective goods is 
used to describe people or groups who do not contribute their shares but still benefit from 
the public goods offered (Samuelson, P.A. 1954).  The benefit is also considered 
“positive externalities”, meaning that it is unaccounted for by the pricing system.  
Although the term “free riders” does not necessarily imply that they ride for free 
intentionally or deliberately, there is a strong incentive for individuals to misrepresent 
their true marginal utility for a public good in a game theoretic setting.   
 
The term “free rider” has also been used in many other areas as well.  For example, in 
international trade, World Trade Organization defines free-rider as a “country that does 
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not make any trade concessions but profits, nonetheless from tariff cuts and concessions 
made by other countries negotiating under the most-favored nation principle.”  In 
electric utility industry, providers have difficulty implementing different pricing for 
different levels of reliability because the customer and its neighbors all connect to the 
same power line and therefore all sign up for the lowest reliability plan, hoping to free-
ride off their neighbors (Brown & Marshall, 2001). 
 
In marketing, “free-riders” often refers to those consumers who take advantage of 
services (that are often free) offered by one company (or marketing channel) but make 
the purchase from another company (a competitor) or channel.  For example, a consumer 
can go to company A’s store or website to learn about a product and then place an order 
from company B for lower prices.   Therefore, these consumers are free-riding off 
company A’s services.  (Company B can also be regarded as free riding off company A 
because it benefits from company A’s services without paying for it.)  A second example 
would be that when a company has two marketing channels, for example, “brick and 
mortar” and “internet”.  The “brick and mortar” offers more services such as product 
demonstration by salespersons, but at a higher price than the “internet” channel.  A 
consumer can free-ride if he gets the product demonstration in “brick and mortar” but 
buys it from the “internet” for less.  Wu et al (2004) studied the implication of free 
riding in e-commerce. 
 
Same as the cases of free-riding on public goods, the free-riders on acquisition incentives 
and retention incentives do not necessarily hide their marginal utility (or propensity) 
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deliberately.  However, they “free-ride” by taking the incentives that are not intended for 
them.  It is the job of the companies and marketing professionals to identify and reduce 
these free-riders because doing so will not only improve the profit from a company’s 
perspective but also will improve efficiency from an economy’s perspective.  The term 
“free-riders” defined in this study takes the meaning of “hidden preferences” and “taking 
the benefit that is not intended for them”. 
 
Examples 
In this study, I propose the concept of “free-riders” in the setting of customer acquisition 
and retention.  Some examples of free-riders in this setting are: 1) a consumer who will 
buy a product anyway but still takes an incentive offer that is meant for enticing 
undecided customers; 2) a cell phone user who will renew the service contract anyway 
but still receives renewal incentives; 3) a new home owner who is ready to install a cable 
TV service takes advantages of the incentive offer aimed at inducing satellite subscribers 
to switch.  In these cases, consumers free-ride on incentive offers.  Incentives spent on 
these free-riders are “wasted” because they will purchase the product or service even 
without the incentives. 
 
Free-rider Characterized in the Context of Switching Cost and Incentives 
This section characterizes free-rider in the contexts of switching cost and incentives as 
they were defined earlier this chapter.  The motivation of doing so is to regard free-riders 
as special cases of customers or prospects with certain characteristics.   
Free-rider in Acquisition 
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A free rider in acquisition is someone whose net switching-in cost is very low or less than 
zero.  For example, a new home owner who is very eager to sign up a cable TV service 
is equivalent of having very low switching costs.  As discussed earlier, if net switching 
cost is less than zero, then the customer is acquired.  Therefore, for a customer like this, 
an incentive will be a “waste” of money and will allow the free rider to free-ride.  
Apparently, the rule for efficient use of acquisition incentive is: The lower the switching-
in cost is, the lower the acquisition incentive is needed.  For free riders, the best strategy 
is to offer them no incentives. 
The more effective and efficient use of acquisition incentives includes:  
1) Discriminate: identify each customer’s natural switching-in cost.  Offer 
incentives only enough to offset their switching-in costs.  
2) Attract customers whose natural switching-in cost are lower.  (However, it has 
been realized that some low-switching-cost customers can also have low 
switching-out cost, making it difficult to retain them.) 
3) Decrease their artificial switching-in cost.  For example, new cell phone carriers 
welcomed the regulation of cell phone number portability, which allowed cell 
phone number to be kept by the consumer even when they switch carriers.  
 
Free-riders in Retention 
A free rider in retention is someone whose switching-out cost is very high.  Even 
without being offered any incentives, these customers will still not defect.  A retention 
incentive offered to them creates free-riding.  For example, a discount on a two-year cell 
phone contract for people who consider switching carrier “not worth the trouble” will 
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result in free-riding of the retention incentives.  Another example is a renewal incentive 
offered to a user who does not intend to switch at all. 
Therefore, the strategy of efficient retention incentive is: The higher the switching-out 
cost is, the lower the retention incentive is needed. 
The company can take the following measures to improve effectiveness:  
1) Discriminate: identify each customer’s natural switching-out cost.  Offer 
incentives only to those with low switching-out costs.  
2) Attract customers whose natural switching-out cost are higher.  (Note: 
Actually, if a customer’s switching-out cost is negligible, then the customer is 
not considered an acquisition by definition used in this research.) 
3) Increase the artificial portion of switching-out cost.  (Note: This is often the 
result of customer receiving retention incentive in exchange of a contracted 
early termination penalty.  However, non-contractual ways of increasing 
artificial switching cost can also be implemented, e.g., increased 
services/features such as bank’s on-line bill-pay.)  
3.3.2 Summary 
The following table summarizes the definition of free rider and non free rider in 
acquisition and retention, as well as the conditions (in terms of incentives) need for being 
acquired or retained. 
 
The Figure 2 illustrates the switching-cost based definition of free rider, the criterion for 
acquisition, and the effect of acquisition incentives.  
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The Figure 3 illustrates the switching-cost based definition of free rider, the criterion for 
retention, and the effect of retention incentives.  
 
In this study, we assume that the pool of prospects and the pool of existing customers, as 
well as switching cost distribution, and the number of free riders in prospect and existing 
customers are exogenous, i.e., the company can neither change the characteristics of its 
prospects or customers, nor can it manipulate the switching cost. 
The only measure that the companies can take is to try to incentive-discriminate, i.e., to 
identify free riders and prevent them from receiving incentives.  
 
3.4 Incentive Discrimination and Its Effects 
3.4.1 Incentive-Discrimination 
In the context of acquisition and retention free riders discussed above, incentive-
discrimination in this model is defined as the ability to distinguish free riders from non 
free riders. This ability can be mathematically expressed as the percentage of free riders 
that the company can identify.  A company without such ability will be able to identify 
0% of the free riders.  A company with a perfect ability will be able to identify 100% of 
the free riders. 
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3.4.2 The “Targeting” Effect of Incentive-Discrimination  
When a company can incentive-discriminate, it can make “targeted” offers to certain 
prospects/customers, and save money as a result.  For example, in customer acquisition, 
if a company is not able to incentive-discriminate, it has to offer all prospects incentives.  
However, if the company has the ability to incentive-discriminate, it only needs to give 
incentive offers to non free riders.  This will 1) reduce promotion/marketing costs, e.g., 
mailing cost, by only sending the offers to the customers whose decisions will be swayed 
by the incentives, and 2) reduce incentive costs by only giving incentives to these 
customers (non free riders).  Therefore, when a company can incentive-discriminate, the 
marketing cost and acquisition cost will be less than that when it cannot discriminate. 
 
3.4.3 The “Favoring” Effect of Incentive-Discrimination on Acquisition and 
Retention Incentive Allocation 
Another effect of incentive-discrimination is that it can affect the optimal allocation of 
money between acquisition incentive and retention incentive. 
Suppose that a company has 100 existing customers whose retention costs follow a 
uniform distribution ranging from -$20 to $80 in $1 increment, if the company would like 
to allocate all its money on retention, then to retain 90 of them, without any ability to 
discriminate, the company would need to offer an incentive of $70 per person to 
everyone.  The total cost of retaining 90 customers is $70*90=$6300. 
 
Also suppose that it has 300 prospects whose acquisition costs follow a uniform 
distribution ranging from -$20 to $80 in $1 increment, If the company would like to 
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spend all its money on acquisition, then to attract 90 of them, with the knowledge of who 
the free riders are, the company will have a significant advantage.  Realizing that even 
without offering any incentives, there will still be 20% (or 60) of the prospects joining the 
company because they are free riders (whose switching cost is less than zero), the 
company would only need to offer $10 per person to the non free riders.  This would 
attract an additional 30 prospects.  The total cost of acquiring 90 prospects is 
$10*30=$3000. 
 
The result shows that it is better for the company to spend money on acquisition than 
retention.  This is the case because the ability to identify free riders makes it more 
efficient to provide more incentives to acquisition than retention.  In other words, the 
relative strength of the ability to incentive-discriminate in acquisition makes it more 
favorable to spend on acquisition.   
 
3.4.4 Discussion 
From the above examples, we can observe that: first, it is possible that spending money 
on acquiring new customers can be just as effective as retaining existing ones; second, 
the optimal allocation between acquisition and retention depends on customer preferences 
and incentive-discrimination on both the acquisition and the retention.  In other words, 
we have a preliminary answer to the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter, 
e.g., whether or not to spend money on acquisition incentives or retention incentives, or 
both.  The answer is that the optimal allocation will depend on the following factors:  
• Existing customers’ preferences 
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• Prospects’ preferences 
• Ability to differentiate existing customers 
• Ability to differentiate prospects  
This also proves that the popular belief that retaining customer is less expensive than 
acquiring customer is not always true.  First of all, the assumptions about the retention 
cost and acquisition cost refer to average costs.  If we take existing customers as a whole 
and the prospects as a whole, then it is generally true that the average retention cost per 
existing customer is much less than the average acquisition cost per prospect.  However, 
it is important to point out that not all existing customers are equal in terms of retention 
reservation price.  The same is true for prospect customers, i.e., not all prospects have 
the same switching costs.  
 
Therefore, although on average, it is more costly to acquire a new customer than to retain 
an old customer, at the individual level, it is possible that it is less costly to acquire a 
particular new customer than to retain a particular existing customer.  The key is to 
identify those particular new customers, specifically, those new customers with low 
acquisition costs.  The example also shows that to provide more conclusive answers to 
the questions raised in the beginning of the chapter, a more systematic way of studying 
the quantitative relations between the factors and the outcomes is needed. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology: Mathematical Model 
4.1 Why Mathematical Model? 
As stated in Chapter 3, the central question this study will answer is: Given a customer 
pool, a customer preference distribution for acquisition and retention, what will be the 
optimal level of acquisition spending vs. retention spending vs. analytics spending, so 
that profit is maximized?   
The above question requires the study of the determinants of optimal incentive decisions 
and the solution in a quantitative manner.  Therefore, to study the effects of these 
determinants quantitatively, a mathematical model is suitable.  A mathematical model 
uses mathematical variables and functions to describe the relations it represents.  The 
real-world factors/determinants that affect the outcome are represented by mathematical 
variables in the model.  The relations between the factors are represented by 
mathematical functions.  Not only that the research question makes it necessary for us to 
employ a mathematical model, but also that the knowledge of the variables, function 
forms, or the properties of the relations between variables makes it feasible to construct 
such a model.  For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, the condition for switching can 
be clearly expressed mathematically, i.e., the relation between number of free riders 
identified and the analytics spending can be expressed in mathematical functions that are 
consistent with the property of diminishing returns.  Therefore, all of the above 
knowledge about the mathematical relations between variables affords us the feasibility 
of formulating a mathematical model. 
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4.2 Mathematical Model vs. Other Methods 
Besides mathematical model, other methods such as numerical optimization and survey 
research have also been used in the study of business/marketing decisions.  However, 
mathematical model has its unique advantages over other methods.  Mathematical model 
is very suitable for solving optimization problems because of it uses clearly defined 
mathematical functions.  Comparing to numerical optimization method such as some 
software packages, mathematical model has its advantages in that it provides not only the 
result of an optimal solution, but also a transparent mapping of the relations between the 
parameters and the outcome.  It is also possible to reach a closed-form solution, which 
the numerical optimization usually cannot.   
The advantages of mathematical model over survey method also lies in its explicit 
expression of the relationship between variables.  Also, because mathematical models’ 
clear and concise representation of the relations, and its flexibility for modification and 
revision, as well as its ability to perform what-if analysis, it is more advantageous to 
utilize this method whenever the conditions allow. 
 
(However, the use of mathematical model in solving an optimization problem does not 
necessarily exclude the use of numerical optimization or survey, etc.  In fact, when 
certain types of problems or certain assumptions/relations of the problems make it too 
complex to interpret a mathematical model, numerical optimization should be used 
instead.  Also, survey method can provide the foundations on which the mathematical 
models are built.  For example, the assumed relationship between any two variables can 
be modified, either in terms of function form, or in terms of parameter values, if the 
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survey results demonstrate a different reality than the mathematical model had originally 
portrayed.) 
 
4.3 Relevance in Mathematical Representation 
A good mathematical model should closely reflect the reality it abstracts from.  In the 
current research, the model is formulated based on the understanding of the concept and 
the relations of the elements and factors in customer acquisition and retention.   
Certainly, there are more than one way of mathematically expressing these concepts and 
relationships, nevertheless, the analysis is robust enough to encompass variations.  For 
example, as we will see in the next chapter, the relationship between free riders identified 
and the analytics spending is expressed in a quadratic function.  The real-world function 
might be different.  However, the quadratic function captures the most important 
properties of the relationship, such as the concavity, i.e., in this particular case, the 
diminishing return of the analytics spending. 
 
4.4 Advantages and Possible Future Expansions 
One of the major advantages of utilizing a mathematical model is that we can plug in 
different assumptions by changing different function forms or parameters.  Using 
mathematical model also makes it possible to expand the current model. 
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The current research built on the previous studies on optimal incentive allocation 
( references here ), and can potentially be developed or modified into either part of a 
larger model or a model with different assumptions on the detailed level.  For example, 
one of the assumptions of this model is that the price is already determined.  An 
expansion of the model can allow both price and incentives to change.  Under that 
situation, the number of free-riders will be a function of price, instead of an exogenous 
variable in the current model.  This can also allow us to study the optimal combination 
of price and incentives, e.g., low-price-low-incentive or high-price-high-incentive.  The 
net price (price minus incentive) might be the same between the above two options, but 
the effects are different because the effect of price and incentive are different (the high-
high combination is usually accompanied by a longer contract and is therefore more 
“captive” than the low-low combination, for example.) 
 
Another possible variation of the current model is to use exponential function, instead of 
quadratic function, to describe the relations between analytics spending and the free 
riders identified.  Also, the customers’ and the prospects’ preferences distributions, 
which are currently assumed to be uniform distributions, can be changed to other type of 
distributions. 
 
In summary, there are numerous possible expansions or variations of this model that 
would afford the future researchers abundant opportunities for exploration and 
improvement. 
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Chapter 5: Base Model: Acquisition Incentive vs. Retention 
Incentive 
5.1 Model Formulation 
 
In this section, I will propose a constrained optimization model, make certain 
assumptions about the relationships and the parameters, and solve for the optimal level of 
acquisition incentives and retention incentives. 
 
Incentive-Discrimination 
In the context of free riders discussed above, incentive-discrimination in this model is 
defined as the ability to distinguish free riders from non free riders. Mathematically, it is 
expressed as percentage of free riders that the company can identify.  A company 
without such ability will be able to identify 0% of the free riders.  A company with 
perfect ability will be able to identify 100% of the free riders. 
 
Assumptions 
There following assumptions are for the base model only.  In the extended models, 
assumption 4 will be changed. 
Assumption 1 (Equal margin assumption): All customers, once acquired or retained, 
make equal contribution to company’s profitability.  
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Assumption 2 (Uniform distribution assumption): Customer reservation prices follow a 
uniform distribution. 
Assumption 3 (Linear function assumption):  The acquisition rate and retention rate are 
linear functions of acquisition incentives and retention incentives respectively.  
(Consequently, the Marginal Acquisition Rate and Marginal Retention Rate, which are 
the slopes of the acquisition rate and retention rate function, are constants.)  
Assumption 4 (Cost components): The cost of acquisition incentives and retention 
incentives are the only variable components of acquisition and retention cost.  The cost 
for devising the incentive-discrimination, administering and implementing the incentives 
are excluded.  The reason for this is that the base model is primarily concerned with the 
allocation of incentives between acquisition and retention when discrimination is 
involved.  Therefore, other factors are treated as control variables or constants. 
 
Problem Definition 
For a corporate executive who is in charge of acquisition and retention functions, his goal 
is to make decisions at the beginning of the month so as to reach/maintain a pre-
determined number of customers at the end of the month at the minimum costs.  The pre-
determined number of customers is set by the corporation.  At the executive’s disposal is 
the allocation of incentive expenditure between acquisition and retention.   
Therefore, this situation can be summarized as follows: 
  
• Objective: Minimizing Total Acquisition and Retention Expenditures 
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• Constraints: Maintaining a Predetermined Number of Total Customers at the End 
of the Month 
• Decision Variable: Allocation of incentives 
• Parameters/Assumptions: As listed in the above sections. 
 
5.2 Solving for Optimum  
The above defined problem can be characterized as a constrained optimization problem.  
Lagrange Multiplier method is used to solve this problem. 
Variables and their definitions are listed in Table 6. 
 
Note: the detailed discuss of r1 and r2 are in section 3.3.2.  
The objective function v (sum of total acquisition expenditure and retention expenditure) 
and constraint function u (sum of number of customers acquired and retained) are 
formulated as follows: 
Let u be the total cost of acquisition and retention, and v be the total number of 
customers. 
Since the total number of customers is composed of four groups: 
• the total number of free-riders among prospect customers acquired 1f  
• the total number of non free-riders among prospect customers acquired 
1
1
1 r
xg  
• the total number of free-riders among existing customers retained 2f  
• the total number of non free-riders among existing customers retained 
2
2
2 r
xg  
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To set up Lagrange Multiplier, let 
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where λ is the Lagrange Multiplier. 
Set partial derivatives of the above function equal to zero: 
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Solving the above equations, the optimal acquisition incentive ( *1x ) and the optimal 
retention incentive ( *1x ) are: 
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5.3 Discussion: The Advantages and Disadvantages of Retention vs. 
Acquisition 
 
From a company’s perspective, although a typical existing customer usually has 
switching cost advantages over a prospect, there are some disadvantages in implementing 
retention incentives compared with acquisition incentives.   
 
As it is shown in the above numeric example, when the free-riders are 15% of the 
prospect customers and 50% of the existing customers, the company’s optimal strategy is 
to offer $27.36 in acquisition incentives per person vs. $10.70 in retention incentives per 
person.  In this particular case, the optimal strategy is to give prospect customers about 
two to three times the level of incentives offered to the existing customers. 
 
If a company cannot detect whether a particular customer will churn or not, then it has to 
offer the same retention incentives to all existing customers.  The problem with this 
situation is that there can be more existing customers who are not contemplating churning 
than those who are.  A blanket retention incentive will be “wasted” on these “free 
riders”, customers who are not considering churning anyway. 
 
On the acquisition side, however, an acquisition incentive will not be “wasted” on 
customers who do not want to join because a customer cannot get the incentive unless he 
signs up with the company. 
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However, there are potential free riders in prospect customers as well - people who would 
sign up anyway even without the incentive, in a competitive market, where the 
competitions offer incentives, the number of these “wasted” acquisition offers would be 
negligible.  So in this sense, acquisition incentives are “naturally” more targeted than 
retention incentive in that the former is much less likely given to the free riders than the 
latter. 
 
The above example also demonstrates that when there are significant free-riders, the 
optimal allocation of retention and acquisition will shift.  Although the reservation price 
for an existing customer is often only a fraction of the reservation price for a prospect 
customer, because the company cannot identify free-riders, any incentive given to this 
existing customer will be offered to other customers (including free-riders) as well.  
Therefore, the existence of free-riders dilutes the company’s retention efforts. 
 
Since there are more free-riders in retention than in acquisition, the retention efforts are 
more diluted than the acquisition efforts.  This explains why many companies appear to 
be “under-spending” on retention. 
 
It is interesting to note that economists generally agree that free riders can bring the 
following consequences, which are similar to the effects of free riders on retention: 
1) Goods affected are under-produced.  The presence of free riders diminishes the 
company’s incentives for providing these goods and services, such as free website 
information and review.   
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2) As a result of the first consequence, the overall market demand will decrease 
because of a lower level of information and confidence and a higher level of 
uncertainty. 
3) Market will be less efficient. 
 
An important distinction must be made to avoid possible confusion.  In early sections it 
was stated that the companies usually have more information about their existing 
customers than about the prospect customers.  More information usually leads to a better 
ability to incentive-discriminate.  However, the reason why retention efforts have more 
“waste” is that the process of acquisition has its “built-in” mechanism of self-screening, 
i.e., only those who explicitly changed their status (from a prospect customer to a 
customer) will receive the acquisition incentives.  In retention, every existing customer 
receives the retention incentives, whether he is considering leaving or not. 
 
Sometimes companies can certainly give incentives only when a customer is in the 
process of leaving.  This would avoid giving incentives to the customers who are not 
considering leaving.  However, sometimes it is already too late when the customer has 
already made the move, for example, signed contract with another provider.  Another 
issue is that the customer could be “bluffing” in order to get a better deal.  This situation 
belongs in the domain of game theory and will be briefly discussed in chapter 7 of this 
dissertation. 
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5.4 Summary - Levels of Discrimination and Consequences on 
Acquisition/Retention with Free Riders 
 
The optimal acquisition and retention incentive formula 
2
22
1
11
12 22 g
rf
g
rfxx −+=  shows 
that: 
1) The relative level of optimal acquisition incentive and retention incentive depends on 
the number of free riders among prospects and existing customers. 
2) The relative level of optimal acquisition incentive and retention incentive depends on 
the effectiveness of acquisition and retention incentives. 
3) The higher the number of free riders in prospects, the lower the optimal acquisition 
incentive per person, and vice versa. 
4) The higher the effectiveness of acquisition incentive, the higher the optimal acquisition 
incentives per person. 
 
Since the number of free-riders is negatively related to the ability to incentive 
discriminate, we can conclude that a better ability to discriminate (either a population of 
prospect customers or existing customers) will increase the optimal spending on that 
population. 
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5.5 Consistency with LTV (Life-time Value) Model  
The popular LTV model uses a multi-period approach, but the current research model 
uses a one-period set-up.  Is the conclusions drawn from this research consistent with the 
popular LTV model’s calculation?  
Yes, if the following assumptions are met.  The first two assumptions are the common 
assumptions used in LTV models (Gupta et al, 2003).  The third assumption is part of 
the base model.  
1) Constant margin of a customer in the calculation of LTV of a customer:  The 
constant margin means that the profit margin remains the same from period to 
period for the same customer. 
2) Constant retention rate in the calculation of LTV of a customer: Although for a 
particular customer, his retention rate for any period is either 0 or 1, to calculate 
his LTV, which is actually an “expected” value of LTV, we use the portfolio’s 
retention rate.  So the constant retention rate is also with respect to time period, 
meaning that the retention rate of the portfolio remains the same from one period 
to the next. 
3) Equal margin of customers in the base model:  This is an assumption for the base 
model only.  Here, the “equal margin” means all customers have the same 
amount of profit margin regardless whether he is a new customer or an existing 
customer.  The reason for this assumption is that it allows the customer 
portfolio’s value to be represented by the number of customers in that portfolio 
minus the cost of acquisition and retention.  This will simplify the calculation 
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involved and still maintain the model result’s reasonable robustness and its ability 
to generalize. 
 
Because the above assumptions are usually an adequate approximation to reality, the 
conclusion drawn from the current research is valid under the LTV calculation.  The 
detailed proof is in Appendix I. 
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Chapter 6: Extended Model: Optimizing Analytics Spending 
and Incentive 
6.1 Optimizing Analytics Spending  
In the last section, the ability to incentive-discriminate customers is treated as exogenous.  
The analysis answers the question of “how to optimally allocate money if the company 
can only choose between acquisition incentives and retention incentives?”  In this 
section, we will add analytics spending to the above situation and the ability to incentive-
discriminate is defined as a function of analytics spending.  So the analysis will answer 
the question of “how to optimally allocate money if the company can choose between 
acquisition incentives, retention incentive, and analytics spending?” 
 
A direct effect of analytics is the increased ability to differentiate customers.  An 
increase in analytics spending can usually improve the ability to differentiate/incentive-
discriminate.  However, because the effect of analytics spending varies from one project 
to another, it is difficult to have a universal function form that describes the relationship 
between money spent and the discrimination achieved.  Nevertheless, on any specific 
project, one can often obtain the cost and discrimination information about different 
analytical methods.   
6.2 Model Formulation 
Variables and Units 
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The variables used in this extended model are listed in Table 7. 
 
The General Model and the Reduced Model 
The general model, which examines the effects of the incentives and analytics spending, 
includes the following four variables: acquisition incentive, retention incentive, 
acquisition analytics spending, retention analytics spending.  Assuming the total number 
of the free riders in retention is fr, then the total cost is consisted of the following six 
components: cost of incentive to acquisition free riders, cost of incentive to acquisition 
non free riders, cost of incentive to retention free riders, cost of incentive to retention non 
free riders, cost of acquisition analytics spending, and cost of retention analytics spending 
respectively: 
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Our preliminary testing on such a “general model” shows that it is not mathematically 
tractable for closed form analysis, thus rendering the results almost uninterpretable.  
Therefore, a “reduced” version, which assumes that retention analytics spending is a 
constant and its effect is also a constant, is examined instead.  Although holding the 
retention analysis spending constant prevents us from examining the dynamic effects of 
simultaneously changing acquisition analytics spending and retention analytics spending, 
as the results show below, the “reduced” model still provides a satisfactory level of 
insight into the interactions between analytics spending and incentives while maintaining 
its generalizability despite the simplifying assumptions.  In addition, this treatment 
actually reflects many real-world situations, under which it is only possible for firms to 
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vary the spending on analytics of either the acquisition or the retention side.  For 
example, since in many companies, acquisition analytics spending budget is usually 
controlled by marketing department and retention analytics spending budget is controlled 
by customer service department, it is realistic to assume that a company is only able to 
control or change one of its analytics. 
 
Since the only effect of retention analytics spending in the general model is to reduce the 
retention free-riders, the effect of a constant retention analytics spending with a particular 
number ( rf ) of unidentified retention free-riders is mathematically equivalent to the 
effect of no analytics spending with a reduced number ( 2f ) of total retention free-riders.  
Therefore, the general model with a constant retention analytics spending is equivalent to 
a reduced model with the following three variables: acquisition incentive, retention 
incentives, and acquisition analytics spending.  With this simplification, we have the 
following cost function: 
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For convenience, this research assumes that the retention analytics is a constant and the 
only effect of analytics spending examined is that of acquisition analytics.  Because of 
the symmetry between acquisition and retention in this mathematical model, the result 
and conclusion of the current analysis also applies to when the acquisition analytics 
spending is a constant and the retention analytics spending is a variable.   The only 
changes to the analysis and conclusion will be to switch all “acquisition” to “retention”. 
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The “reduced” form of the model will be examined in this study. 
 
The Effect of Analytics Spending: Quadratic Function Form  
In this study, the effect of analytics spending is characterized as the identification of free-
riders among customers, or the reduction of unidentified free-riders.  In general, the 
more the company spends on analytics, the more free-rider it will be able to identify, and 
the fewer free-riders will remain unidentified.  Since there was no previous study about 
the effects of analytics spending on the identification of free riders, there is no readily 
available mathematical function form for the relation between analytics spending and 
percent of free riders remaining or unidentified.  However, by examining the situation I 
propose the following properties for the mathematical relation between analytics 
spending (z1) and the percent of free riders remaining (q):   
1. A monotonically decreasing function.  This is because the more money a firm 
spends on analytics, the better the analytics will be, or the better the predictive 
model predicts.  As a result, more free riders will be identified and the free riders 
remaining unidentified will be less. 
2. q is equal to 100% when z1 is zero, and 0% when z1 is equal to m1.  This means 
that when no money is spent on analytics, no free riders will be identified.  The 
remaining free riders will be 100%.  And if the company spends enough money 
(m1), all free riders will be identified and the remaining free riders will be zero. 
3. A diminishing return of the analytics spending.  This means that if it is less costly 
to identify the most apparent free riders than the least apparent ones.  The law of 
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diminishing returns is one of the common assumptions between the money or 
resources allocated and the outcome of the input (Samuelson, 1954).  Taking 
retention of existing customers as an example, it is reasonable to assume the 
diminishing return of analytics because the free riders with highest switching-out 
costs are usually the easiest to identify.  These customers usually exhibit 
behaviors that are very “loyal” such as having long tenure and having purchases 
of high quantities.  However, the switching behavior of those whose switching-
out cost is close to zero are usually more difficult to predict since they are 
“borderline” free riders.  More information and advanced analytical solutions are 
usually required to identify these “less apparent” free riders, making it more 
costly to identify them than the “more apparent” free riders. 
 
The following function form satisfies the requirement of the properties of the relation 
between analytics spending (z1) and percent free riders remaining unidentified (q) and it 
has a simple function form. 
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Where  
q is the proportion of free-riders remaining (unidentified) 
m1 is the “Analytics dollar required to identify all acquisition free-riders” 
z1 is the “Analytics spending”  
 
Another function form, an exponential function, was also examined.  However, a 
preliminary examination of the exponential form shows that the mathematical functions 
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become too complex to reach a closed form solution.  Therefore, since no theoretical or 
empirical evidence is present to favor other function forms, and the quadratic form 
maintains the feasibility of a closed form solution and in the meantime possesses the 
desirable properties, it is chosen as the function form between free riders remaining 
unidentified and the analytics spending.   
 
The Figure 4 shows that when $100,000 spending on analytics is needed to identify all 
free-riders (m1=$100,000), the effect of actual analytics spending z1 will have on the free-
riders.  For example, when the analytics spending is at $50,000, there will be 25% of the 
free-riders remain unidentified. 
 
Objective Function and Constraints 
Since the goal of the company is to maintain a preset level of number of customers and 
minimize the costs of acquiring and retaining these customers, we define the objective 
function as the sum of the cost of acquisition incentives ( 21
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We define the constraints as the sum of total number of customers acquired 
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6.3 Analysis and Results 
We have examined the effects of different m1 on the three other variables.  The analysis 
has directly answered the question of “what will be the optimal strategy, in terms of 
spending on analytics, acquisition incentives, and retention incentives at different 
difficulty levels of identifying free-riders?” 
 
The above constrained optimization leads to a fourth degree function.   This function 
shows that the total cost of incentives and analytics spending varies as the amount of 
analytics spending varies.  Also, for a given level of analytics spending (z1), there exists 
an optimal combination of acquisition incentive (x1) and retention incentive (x2) that 
minimizes the cost of incentives under this specific analytics spending.  By varying the 
amount of analytics spending, the optimal acquisition incentive and retention incentive 
will also vary accordingly.  The function allows us to solve for the optimal level of 
analytics spending that minimizes the total cost of acquisition incentives, retention 
incentive, and analytics spending. 
 
Taking derivative of the above fourth degree function gives us a cubic function.  The 
cubic function is then solved and the conditions of the solution, the feasibility of the 
solution, and the boundary conditions are examined. 
 
Although there are many parameters in the model, the analysis primarily focuses on the 
effect of the level of m on optimal strategies.  The discussion of the extended model is 
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structured in the level of m, the analytics spending required to identify all free-riders.  
The range of m is divided into three regions: low, medium, and high.  
 
In the following sections, I will examine the conditions and the behaviors of the analytics 
spending, incentives, and the total cost in those three regions.  Attention will also be 
given to the two boundaries, or the thresholds, that separate the three regions.  The 
following analysis is based on the assumption that the budgeted total customer number is 
not only greater than the total free-riders but also less than the total free-riders plus one 
type of non-free-riders.  These assumptions exclude any possibility that no spending on 
analytics or incentives is necessary to fill the customer spots.  In other words, we assume 
that to meet the requirement of the budgeted total number of customers, there will need to 
be some non free riders acquired or retained and there are enough non-free-riding 
prospects or customers to fill the spots. 
 
The analysis shows that when holding all other variables constant, the level of m will lead 
to different patterns of optimal spending strategies. 
 
 
6.3.1 The Three Regions of m 
Three categories of m in its increasing order are: Low, Medium, and High.  In business 
languages, these categories correspond to increasing degrees of difficulty in identifying 
free-riders.  In terms of the amount of money that it requires to identify all free-riders, 
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these respective three categories can be characterized as: less costly, moderately costly, 
and very costly. 
 
A Special Value: MH 
The boundary between “moderately costly” and “very costly” analytics is expressed in 
terms of a dollar amount MH.  If m, “the amount of money that is required to identify all 
free-riders”, is less than MH, then the analytics is “Moderately costly”.  If m is greater 
than MH, then the analytics is “Very costly”.  The exact value of this amount MH can be 
calculated by the following formula:  
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The ratios g2/r2 and g1/r1 represent the effectiveness of retention incentive and acquisition 
incentive respectively.  For example, if g1, the number of non free riders, is 10,000 and 
r1, the maximum switching cost is $200, then the ratio g1/r1 is 50.  This means that for a 
$1 per person increase in acquisition incentive, there will be an additional 50 people 
acquired.  Similarly, 
2
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g  can be regarded as the “effectiveness” of retention incentives.  
For example, in calculation of number of customers ( 2
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the number of customers retained when each existing customer is given an incentive of 
$1.  Therefore, when the incentive per person is x2 , 2
2
2 x
r
g customers will be retained. 
We use notation e to represent this ratio.  Therefore, by substituting e2 for g2/r2, and e1 
for g1/r1, we have, 
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Or, simply: 
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The following are the descriptions of the three categories, both in mathematical terms and 
in plain English. 
 
Low m 
In mathematical terms, when m is small enough to satisfy the condition: HMm ≤ , the 
unconstrained z leads to a negative x2.  Because the constraint is x2>=0 (no negative 
incentives), the optimal z under this constraint, i.e., the constrained optimal z, is z0, which 
is the value of z that minimizes the total cost when x2=0.  The optimal solution under 
this situation is: z= z0, x2=0, x1>0. 
 
In plain English, this means that when it is “less costly” to identify the acquisition free-
riders, the optimal strategy is to spend money on acquisition analytics (z>0) to identify 
most of the free-riders.  And since the identification of free-riders makes the acquisition 
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incentives more effective, the firm should spend money on acquisition incentives (x1>0).  
But since the retention incentive becomes relatively ineffective, no money should be 
spent on retention incentives (x2=0). 
 
Figure 5 shows that under the constraint of x2>=0, the total cost reaches its minimum 
point when analytics spending is greater than zero – in this particular case, around 
$10,000. 
 
Medium m 
Mathematically speaking, when m is still small enough to satisfy the condition HMm ≤  
but large enough to lead to an unconstrained x2 that is positive, the optimal z will be 
determined by minimizing a fourth degree function subject to constraints.  The local 
minimum is found when the first derivative is zero and the second derivative is positive, 
as in the point around $10,000 in the above graph.  
The optimal solution is: z=z-optimal, x2>0, x1>0.  
 
In plain English, this means that when it is “moderately costly” to identify the acquisition 
free-riders, the optimal strategy is to spend some money on acquisition analytics (z>0), 
some on acquisition incentives (x1>0), and some on retention incentive (x2>0).  
 
Similar to the above case, the total cost is minimized with a positive analytics spending. 
The z-and-total-cost graph for this case is similar to the one above. 
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High m 
Mathematically, when m is so large as to make HMm > , the optimal z is 0. x1 and x2 are 
determined by the “base model” as described in sections a), b) and c) below. 
 
In plain English, this means that when it is “very costly” to identify the acquisition free-
riders, the optimal strategy is not to spend money on analytics (z=0).  Instead, the money 
will be better spent on acquisition incentive and retention incentives directly. 
The amount spent on each incentive depends on the relative effectiveness of the two 
incentives.  Sometimes it is optimal to spend all on acquisition incentive; sometimes it is 
optimal to spend all on retention incentives; sometime it is optimal to spend some on 
each. 
 
Figure 6 shows that when m is large, the unconstrained optimal z is negative.  Therefore, 
the boundary condition of z>=0 is applied.  So when the analytics spending is zero, the 
total cost is minimized. 
a) Very Effective Retention Incentives 
The ratio of g2/r2 to g1/r1 represents the relative effectiveness of the retention 
incentives to that of the acquisition incentives.  The higher this ratio is, the more 
effective the retention incentive is relative to acquisition incentive.  
If the ratio is greater than the value ( ) 12
1
21 −−−
f
ffc , meaning that the retention 
incentive is very effective relative to acquisition incentive, then the optimal 
strategy is to spend all money on retention incentives only (x1=0, x2>0). 
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As Figure 7 shows, since the mathematically unconstrained optimal x1 is less than 
zero, the boundary condition, x1=0, effectively becomes the best incentive level 
that leads to the lowest total expenditure. 
 
b) Moderately Effective Retention Incentives 
If the ratio of g2/r2 to g1/r1 is between ( ) 221
2
2 fffc
f
−−− and 
( ) 12
1
21 −−−
f
ffc , 
meaning that the retention incentive is moderately effective relative to acquisition 
incentive, then it is optimal to spend money on both the acquisition and retention 
incentives (x1>0, x2>0).   
 
As Figure 8 shows, the mathematically unconstrained optimal x1 is greater than 
zero.  Therefore, it is the optimal acquisition incentive. 
 
c) Weakly Effective Retention Incentives 
If the ratio is smaller than the value ( ) 221
2
2 fffc
f
−−− , meaning that retention 
incentive is not effective, then the optimal strategy is to spend money on 
acquisition incentives only (x1>0, x2=0).  This is shown in Figure 9. 
 
6.3.2 The Boundaries 
There are two boundaries separating the three regions discussed above.  The first is the 
boundary between “moderately costly” and “very costly” analytics.  The threshold 
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between “moderately costly” and “very costly” analytics is the value MH, which is given 
by the following equation: 
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The second is the boundary between “less costly” and “moderately costly” analytics 
It is difficult to algebraically express this threshold in terms of the parameters C, f, and e 
due to the complex function forms such as cubic and trigonometric functions.  However, 
this boundary point can be identified by the point at which the unconstrained retention 
incentive (x2) becomes 0.  (In the “less costly” region, the unconstrained x2 is always 
less than 0. And in the “moderately costly” region, the unconstrained x2 is always greater 
than 0.)   
 
The m level that makes this point, ML, can be calculated through the use of “solver” or 
other mathematical tools by solving the value of 1m  that makes x2 equal to 0. 
At this boundary point, the optimal analytics spending: 
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The optimal acquisition incentive: 
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The optimal retention incentive: 
02 =x  
Table 8 summarizes the optimal strategy under the three regions in the increasing order of 
1m . 
 
6.4 Interpretation of the Results and Discussions 
6.4.1 Ceiling of the Acceptable Cost of Analytics 
Since in formula
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from historical data, a firm can calculate the value MH.  According to the analysis above, 
when the cost of analytics required to identify all free riders (m1) is greater MH, the 
optimal analytics spending (z1) is zero.  Since m1 can usually be estimated by examining 
the total cost of analytics project, including data gathering and predictive modeling, etc, a 
company can evaluate how valuable the analytics will be.  If the analytics is less 
valuable (more expensive), then it makes it unfavorable for the firm to spend any money 
on analytics.  Since the value MH is determined by other parameters such as number of 
free riders, its value marks the threshold above which the analytics will not be valuable 
relative to incentives and therefore the firm should not spend on analytics.  This provides 
a very useful tool for evaluating the cost and benefit of analytical projects before the 
project is started and the cost is incurred. 
. 
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6.4.2 The Effects of Free Riders and Effectiveness of Incentives 
Section 6.3 examined the effects of m1, “the cost of analytics required to identify 100% of 
the acquisition free riders”, has on the optimal spending between acquisition incentive 
and retention incentive.  In this section, I will examine how the optimal levels of 
incentives and analytics spending are affected by other parameters such as number of free 
riders and effectiveness of incentives.   
Since the formula for the high-m boundary MH is: 
3
21
2
21
1
3
21
)11(27
)22(4
ee
ee
fffCM H
+
−−=  
Where 
1
1
1 r
ge =  and 
2
2
2 r
ge =  
We can observe the following relations from the examination of the above equation: 
1. When the number of acquisition free riders (f1) is at a critical value, (2C- f2)/8, MH 
will be the highest.  This means that analytics is most valuable (inexpensive) at 
this point.  Money spent on analytics will be more effective than that spent on 
incentives.  Therefore the optimal strategy is to allocate more money on 
acquisition analytics.   However, when the number of free rider is either lower or 
higher than this point, the analytics becomes less valuable (too expensive).  On 
the one hand, since the effect of acquisition analytics is to identify a percentage of 
acquisition free riders, the more the free riders are, the more free riders will be 
identified by the analytics, making the spending on analytics more effective.  
When the number of acquisition free riders is lower, a lower amount of savings 
will be realized from identifying these free riders.  On the other hand, since free 
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riders are those prospects who would still be acquired even without the incentives, 
when the number of acquisition free riders becomes too large, the firm would not 
need to direct its resources towards analytics and incentives and will still be able 
to attract enough customers.  Therefore, the analytics is more valuable when the 
number of free riders is at an intermediate value.  Too few or too many free 
riders will make the analytics less valuable and result in less spending or even 
zero spending on analytics. 
2. If the number of retention free riders (f2) is sufficiently large, then MH will be 
lower.  This means that when there are a sufficiently large number of retention 
free riders, the acquisition analytics is “very costly” relative to incentives and 
therefore less valuable.  The optimal strategy is to allocate little or no spending 
on acquisition analytics. 
3. If the acquisition incentive is sufficiently effective (a large enough 1e ), then MH 
will be higher.  This means that when the acquisition incentive is very effective, 
the acquisition analytics becomes “less costly” or “moderately costly” relative to 
incentives and it is more valuable.  Therefore the optimal strategy is to spend 
more on acquisition analytics.  The reason for this is that if the acquisition 
incentive is very effective, then it will be more cost-efficient for the company to 
allocate its money to acquisition incentive.  The acquisition analytics spending 
further enhances this effectiveness.   
4. If the retention incentive is sufficiently effective (a large enough 2e ), then MH 
will be low.  This means that the acquisition analytics is “very costly” relative to 
incentives and it is less valuable.  Therefore the optimal strategy is not to 
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spending on acquisition analytics but allocate all spending on incentives.  This is 
the opposite case of the very effective acquisition incentive discussed above.  So 
the result is also opposite to the above case. 
 
The above relations will provide managerial directions for marketing function of the 
company to anticipate the changes in its target market, customer base, customer 
characteristics, etc.  For example, if a company anticipates a new customer group to 
become part of the target market, and if this customer group can be characterized as 
having fewer free-riders, then it might be prudent for the company to consider increasing 
its spending in analytics, even if it was optimal for them not to do so before. 
 
6.4.3 Other insights and observations 
“Less costly” (low-m) vs. “Very costly” (high-m) 
Although under both the “less costly” analytics (low-m) and the “very costly” analytics 
(high-m) situations, the optimal retention incentive (x2) can be zero, the reasons are 
somewhat different: For low-m, x2 is zero because a low-m makes it efficient to identify 
f1, thereby increasing the relative effectiveness of and decreasing the relative 
effectiveness of x2.  Under the high-m, the optimal strategy is to spend nothing on 
analytics (z).  However, if even without the help of analytics, x1 is still highly effective 
compared to x2, then the optimal x2 can also become zero. 
“Less costly” (low-m) and “Moderately costly” (medium-m) vs. “Very costly” (high-
m):  
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In “less costly” (low-m) and “moderately costly” (medium-m) cases, the spending on 
analytics will help to make the incentive spending more cost effective, thus reducing the 
total expenditure.  In “very costly” (high-m) case, any spending on analytics will be less 
effective than to give incentives to the customers directly, therefore the optimal is not to 
spend on analytics.  
 
6.5 Summary 
By bringing in the effect of analytics spending into the model, we are able to examine 
how the optimal allocation is affected by the “cost of analytics spending required to 
identify all free riders”, “the number of free riders”, and “the effectiveness of incentives.” 
The formula of the ceiling of the acceptable cost of analytics is derived.  This would 
enable the companies to better assess the financial aspect of their analytics projects.  
Interpretation of other parameters provides managerial insight and directions on what the 
spending on analytics should be when there is a change in the composition of customer 
base or market competition.  
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Chapter 7: Discussions 
7.1 Summary of Contributions 
This research makes contribution to the managerial science and its application in 
marketing by providing new knowledge in the following aspects:  Conceptually, this 
research builds on the tradition of managerial sciences by taking a quantitative approach 
to develop a new way of distinguishing key concepts involved in acquisition and 
retention.  First, it defines the difference between customer and acquisition by using the 
amount of switching cost.  Second, it distinguishes retention from acquisition by using 
the duration of the contracts.  Such treatment enables us to correctly identify acquisition 
and retention and model them mathematically.  In addition, this research is anchored in 
the business practice by providing a practical interpretation of a phenomenon by 
introducing the concept of “free rider” in acquisition and retention.  Methodologically, 
this research formulates a mathematical model that seeks the balance between reflecting 
the reality and maintaining its relatively concise form and transparent interpretation of the 
model and results.  Mathematically, it analyzes the behavior and interaction between 
incentives and analytics spending, and provides the boundary conditions under which the 
following is true: the optimal acquisition incentive is zero (or non-zero), the optimal 
retention incentive is zero (or non-zero), and the optimal analytics spending is zero (or 
non-zero).  The formula of the ceiling of the acceptable cost of analytics is derived.  
This would enable the companies to better assess the financial aspect of their analytics 
projects.   
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7.2 Specific Contributions 
7.2.1 Acquisition vs. Customer, Incentive vs. Discount 
In previous studies, little attempt has been made to distinguish between a customer and 
an acquisition.  This research makes it clear that not all customers are acquisitions.  The 
emphasis on switching cost as a necessary component of acquisition (and retention) is an 
important contribution of this research.  With this definition of acquisition, i.e., “a 
customer with a significant switching cost,” a marketing manager will not treat any 
customers that are attracted by a price discount as an acquisition.  In addition, the 
definition of “significant” in the term “significant switching cost” opens the possibility 
for future researches to use specific quantitative measures to define acquisition and 
distinguish an acquisition from a customer.  This distinction also encourages companies 
to treat the customers with different switching costs differently. 
 
7.2.2 Acquisition vs. Retention 
Because in most of the cases, the difference between acquisition and retention is clear, 
i.e., acquisition is when a prospect becomes a customer; retention is when an existing 
customer remains a customer, there were no significant discussions devoted to the 
distinction between the two.  However, as discussed in Chapter 3, when the accuracy of 
the amount of acquisition and retention incentives is important, and when there are 
different contracts of different lengths and different discounts, it is crucial to make clear 
distinctions between an acquisition, a retention, and a mixture of acquisition and 
retention.   For example, the time-based definition of acquisition and retention, as 
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proposed in this study, offers a clear and practical way of separating retention and 
retention incentives from certain marketing offers such as a two-year contract, which is 
essentially a mixture of acquisition and retention.  This distinction is not only important 
to the current study, but also is significant for any future studies that require correct 
accounting of the amount of acquisition and retention incentives. 
 
7.2.3 Free Rider 
Another important contribution of this research is the introduction of the “free rider” 
concept into the area of acquisition and retention.  Not only does the free rider concept 
put the prospects or customers into two categories, i.e., free riders and non free riders, 
based on their switching costs, but also it can be expanded by incorporating game 
perspective.  For example, in future researches, one can study the scenario when 
consumers play “game” with the company by masking their true preferences or engaging 
in bluffing, etc.  This would bring the study into the field of game theory.  
 
7.2.4 Modeling 
This research examines in detail the conditions under which the optimal strategy is to 
have acquisition analytics spending, or retention incentive, or acquisition incentive, or a 
combination of the three.  More specifically, it identifies the link between the cost of 
analytics, the effectiveness of the incentives, and the optimal allocation of money.  This 
would provide the marketing managers a tool to optimally allocate funds between 
incentives and analytics spending. 
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7.3 Possible Future Research Directions 
Many possible expansions can be built on the current research by modifying certain 
assumptions or formulations.  For example, instead of using the “number of free riders 
identified” to operationalize the concept “incentive-discrimination”, in future researches, 
one can use different measures such as Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics (Chakravart, 
Laha, and Roy, 1967), which is often used in evaluating credit scoring models.  
Additional attention can be paid to incorporating mis-classifications into the model, for 
example, how to optimize analytics spending and incentive spending when the 
effectiveness of analytics spending is expressed in not only the “number of free riders 
identified,” but also the number of free riders or non free riders misclassified. 
 
Another direction in the future research would be to conduct surveys or data analysis to 
test and modify the current model.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the mathematical 
modeling method used in the current study can be modified or supplemented by other 
methodologies. 
 
There are several limitations or constraints in the current model that can be modified or 
relaxed in the future researches.  For example, one limitation of the current model is that 
it defines the “incentive-discrimination” only as “identifying the free riders”.  A more 
“thorough” discrimination that not only identifies the free riders, but also further 
distinguishes the high-cost non free riders from the low-cost non free riders can also be 
studied.  Also, the current research placed a constraint of positive incentives on the 
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model.  In practice, although a company cannot explicitly impose a negative incentive 
(or a penalty) on a prospect or customer, it can use other means, e.g., membership fees, 
initiation fees, and renewal fees, to achieve the objective of negative incentive.   One 
needs to be careful in taking such an approach because there might not be a continuum 
from incentives to neutrality to disincentives that customers react to in a linear fashion.  
This is at least partly due to the fact that companies tend to brag about positive incentives 
and bury the negative ones in the fine print.  Nevertheless, a model allowing negative 
incentive and also negative acquisition and retention that discourages unprofitable 
prospects or customers can be a possible direction of future studies. 
 
Finally, from an even broader perspective, one can connect the current research to other 
related issues.  For example, many marketing companies utilized geo-demographic data 
clusters that categorize consumers into different clusters or segments instead of 
continuous scores.  Therefore, we can view this as an additional constraint to the model 
that the criteria for classifying customers are discrete, instead of continuous. 
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Table 1. Examples of Switching Cost and Incentive 
 Level of  
natural 
switching cost 
Artificial 
switching 
cost 
created by 
contract? 
Incentives 
(Examples) 
Cell Phone Low Yes One-time Cash discount 
Cable 
TV/Satellite 
Low Yes One-time Cash discount 
Credit Card Low No. 
 
Point/ 
Mileage 
Low Introductory 
Rate/ 
Point or cash rebate 
Bank 
Accounts/ 
Trading 
Accounts 
High 
 
 
No. 
 
On-line 
Services 
One-time Cash Bonus 
($50-$100) 
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Table 2. Price Discount vs. Incentive 
 Specific 
Questions 
Price Discount Acquisition/Retention
Incentives 
 
Strategic 
Product-centered or 
customer-centered? 
Product-centered Customer-centered 
Specific 
Objectives 
Is switching cost 
involved? 
Is it aimed at 
acquisition/retention?
No Yes 
Operational Scope of Target? 
Publicized  
Mass targeted  
Publicized 
Individual/group 
targeted 
nd sometimes 
confidential. 
 
Effects 
(Time 
Perspective) 
Affect current period 
or multi-period 
demand? 
Increases current 
period demand 
only 
 
Increases current 
period and multi-
period demand 
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Table 3.  Customer Types and Switching Costs 
Type of Customers Natural 
Switching-in 
Cost 
Natural 
Switching-out 
Cost 
Existing Customers N/A Low or High 
At-large Customers Low N/A 
Competitors’ Customers High N/A 
 94
Table 4.  Terms in the Model 
Terms Definition Unit Operational Calculation 
Acquired A new customer who 
signed up and will stay for 
a minimum of one year 
  
Retained An existing customer who 
will stay for a minimum 
of one additional year 
  
Acquisition 
Rate 
Customers acquired as a 
percentage of total 
prospect customers in a 
month 
% Number of Acquired/ 
Number of Total Prospect 
Retention 
Rate 
Customers retained as a 
percentage of total 
existing customers in a 
month. 
% Number of Retained/ 
Number of Total Existing 
Acquisition 
Incentive 
Amount of money offered 
to a prospect customer for 
the purpose of acquisition 
in a month 
$ per 
person 
 
Acquisition 
Expenditure 
Total Amount of money 
spent on acquisition 
incentives in a month 
$  
Retention 
Incentive 
Amount of money offered 
to an existing customer 
for the purpose of 
retention in a month 
$ per 
person 
 
Retention 
Expenditure 
Total Amount of money 
spent on retention 
incentives in a month 
$  
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Table 5.  Free Riders and Non Free Riders 
 Free rider Non free rider Incentive needed 
to acquire or retain 
Prospects Switch Cost<=0 Switch Cost>0 Incentive>Switch cost 
Existing Customer Switch Cost>0 Switch Cost<0 Incentive>- Switch Cost 
(or Incentive>Switch Benefit) 
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Table 6. Variables in the Base Model 
variables Definition Unit 
1x  the acquisition incentive dollar amount 
offered to prospect customers  
$/Person 
2x  the retention incentive dollar amount 
offered to existing customers  
$/Person 
1f  the total number of free-riders among 
prospect customers 
Person 
2f  the total number of free-riders among 
existing customers 
Person 
1g  the total number of non free-riders 
among prospect customers 
Person 
2g  the total number of non free-riders 
among existing customers 
Person 
1r  the maximum switching-in cost of 
prospect customers 
$/Person 
 
2r  the maximum switching-out benefit of 
existing customers 
$/Person 
 
C the predetermined target of total number 
of customers (sum of acquired and 
retained)  
Person 
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Table 7. Variables in the Extended Model 
variables Definition Unit 
1x  the acquisition incentive dollar amount 
offered to prospect customers  
$/person 
2x  the retention incentive dollar amount 
offered to existing customers  
$/person 
1f  the total number of free-riders among 
prospect customers 
Person 
2f  the total number of free-riders among 
existing customers 
Person 
1g  the total number of non free-riders 
among prospect customers 
Person 
2g  the total number of non free-riders 
among existing customers 
Person 
1r  the maximum reservation price of 
prospect customers 
$/person 
 
2r  the maximum reservation price of 
existing customers 
$/person 
 
C the total number of customers (sum of 
acquired and retained)  
person 
1z  Analytics spending on acquisition $ 
2z  Analytics spending on retention $ 
1m  Analytics $ required to identify all 
acquisition free-riders  
$ 
2m  Analytics $ required to identify all 
retention free-riders 
$ 
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Table 8. Summary of Extended Model Results 
Cost of analytics 
required to identify 
all free riders 
Less Costly Moderately Costly Very Costly 
1m  LMm << 10  HL MmM << 1  1mM H <  
Optimal Acquisition 
Analytics Spending 
(z1) 
z1=z0 0< z1<z0 z1=0 
Acquisition Incentive 
(x1) 
x1>0 x1>0 Base model 
Retention Incentive 
(x2) 
x2=0 x2>0 Base model 
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Figure 1.  Determinants in Customer Switching Decision 
 
Switching or not? 
Condition: Incentive > Switching Cost (Benefit)? 
Switching cost 
(Switch-In vs. Switch-Out) 
Artificial 
Cost
Natural 
Cost 
Preferences Others 
Incentives 
(Acquisition vs. Retention) 
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Figure 2.  Acquisition Free Riders 
 
Free riders   
(f) 
Incentive 
(x) Acquired 
0 
Number of 
Prospects 
(f+g) 
r1 
Number Acquired=All Free Riders + x/r1 * Non Free Riders 
Where r is the maximum switching cost 
Non Free riders 
(g) 
Switching 
Cost  
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Figure 3. Retention Free Riders 
 
Switching 
cost 
Free riders 
(f) 
Incentive (x) 
Retained 
0 
Number of 
Customers 
Non Free riders 
(g) 
-r2 
-x 
Number Retained=All Free Riders + x/r2 * Non Free Riders 
Where r2 is the maximum switching benefit (or Negative Switching Cost) 
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Figure 4.  Unidentified Free Riders as a Function of Analytics Spending 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
 $-   
 $10,000 
 $20,000 
 $30,000 
 $40,000 
 $50,000 
 $60,000 
 $70,000 
 $80,000 
 $90,000 
 $100,000 
Analytics Spending (z1)
Re
m
ai
ni
ng
 F
re
e-
rid
er
s
 104
Figure 5.  Analytics Spending and Total Expenditure: Low m 
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Figure 6.  Analytics Spending and Total Expenditure: High m 
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Figure 7.  Effects of Very Effective Retention Incentive 
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Figure 8. Effects of Moderately Effective Retention Incentive 
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Figure 9.  Effects of Weakly Effective Retention Incentive 
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Appendix I: Consistency with Life-Time Value (LTV) 
formulation 
 
In this section, I will demonstrate that the current model is consistent with LTV model 
formulation, and the conclusions drawn from this model is equally valid under several 
simple assumptions.  
 
LTV (Life-time value) definition and calculation 
 
Life-time value of a customer is the present value of future stream of incomes this 
customer brings.  It is recognized as a common tool for evaluating customer values.  
Gupta (2003) presents LTV calculations in a three-step fashion.  First, the LTV of a 
customer is calculated; then customers are aggregated to “cohorts”; finally cohorts are 
aggregated to the portfolio.  LTV can be regarded as the value of the customer portfolio. 
 
Many conditions can be assumed to simplify the calculation and aggregation, for 
example, one can assume the constant profit margin of a customer from period to period, 
etc. 
 
LTV can incorporate various costs.  For example, Gupta (2003) lists the basic LTV that 
calculates on profit margin (or income) only and an LTV that account for both profit 
margin and acquisition costs.  For this study, I will name a few varieties: 
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LTV (M): profit margin only.  This will be used in the proof that multi-period LTV can 
be simplified to single period. 
LTV(M,A,R): profit margin, acquisition, and retention costs.  This will be used in the 
base model. 
LTV (M,A,R,D): profit margin, acquisition, retention, and discrimination costs.  This 
will be used in the extended models. 
 
Scenario: Portfolio with a preset number of customers 
 
Because of the economics of production, a firm often has a volume of output that is 
optimal with respect to production costs and revenue.  The goal of the marketing 
department is then to maintain this optimal level of demand, or in our case, an optimal 
number of customers. 
 
Therefore,  
1) The optimal number of customers based on production constraints and optimal 
output level is N. 
2) Without efforts of acquiring new customers and retaining existing customers, 
natural attrition will decrease the number of customers to a level below the 
optimal N. 
3) Consequently, the goal of acquisition and retention is to maintain the number of 
customers at the level of n for the current period.  Mathematically, this can be 
expressed as: Number acquired + Number retained = N. 
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Assumptions 
These assumptions will be important in simplifying the calculation and making the 
mathematical derivation valid. 
 
4) Constant margin of a customer in the calculation of LTV of a customer:  The 
constant margin means that the profit margin remains the same from period to 
period for the same customer. 
5) Constant retention rate in the calculation of LTV of a customer: Although for a 
particular customer, his retention rate for any period is either 0 or 1, to calculate 
his LTV, which is actually an “expected” value of LTV, we use the portfolio’s 
retention rate.  So the constant retention rate is also with respect to time period, 
meaning that the retention rate of the portfolio remains the same from one period 
to the next. 
6) Equal margin of customers in the base model:  This is an assumption for the base 
model only.  Here, the “equal margin” means all customers have the same 
amount of profit margin regardless whether he is a new customer or an existing 
customer.  The reason for this assumption is that it allows the customer 
portfolio’s value to be represented by the number of customers in that portfolio 
minus the cost of acquisition and retention.  This will simplify the calculation 
involved and still maintain the model result’s reasonable robustness and its ability 
to generalize. 
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Proof of Equivalency between Single-period and Multi-period 
 
Life-time value of a customer is the present value of future stream of incomes this 
customer brings.  If we denote the profit margin that a customer generates during a 
specific period t as mt, then the life-time value of the customer (LV), with a discount rate 
of i, and a constant retention rate of r, is given by the following formula (Gupta, 2003):  
∑∞
= += 0 )1(t t
t
t
i
rm
LV       (1) 
Under the assumption of an equal revenue stream (constant margin) and a constant 
retention rate, the life-time value can be reduced to a single-period value scaled by a 
constant.   
 
Proof: 
Assuming constant margin for all time period, then mt = m, therefore, 
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Where m is the constant margin and g is a constant (g is a function of i, the discount rate, 
and r, the retention rate.  Since both i and r are assumed constant, g is a constant.) 
 
If we define First-Period-Value (FPV) as the life-time value given t=0, then 
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t
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|    (3) 
(Or simply, FPV is the current period’s margin.) 
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From (2) and (3), we have 
 
gFPVLV *=        (4) 
Where g is a constant,  ∑∞
= += 0 )1(t t
t
i
rg  
 
Interpretation: The life-time value (based on multi-period calculation) can be expressed 
as a constant times the First-period Value. 
 
In summary, with the assumption of constant margin and constant retention rate, 
maximizing the single period (current period or first period) value is equivalent to 
maximizing LV(Life-time Value).  Therefore, the conclusion drawn from single-period 
evaluation will be equally valid under multi-period or Life-time situations. 
 
Unit of analysis: Cohorts, Portfolio 
 
The unit of analysis in Gupta’s (2003) LTV model is a “cohort” of customers.  Because 
of attrition, a percentage of the cohort will churn in every time period.  So a retention 
rate is included as one of the parameters in the calculation of the LTV.  Alternatively, as 
the case in similar calculations by other researchers, the attrition is represented by the 
expected length of tenure, meaning that customer-ship in that cohort will effectively all 
die off after an expected number of periods.  In a typical portfolio, there are many 
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cohorts each at various stages of “degeneration”.  After each cohort’s LTV is calculated, 
the entire portfolio’s LTV is then calculated by aggregating all the cohorts.  
 
Since the analysis in this study is based on a single period time frame, there are only two 
cohorts: new customers acquired and existing customers retained.  And because of the 
assumption of “equal margins”, the two cohorts differ only in their respective acquisition 
cost and retention cost.  Therefore, to maximize the portfolio’s value, we need to 
maximize the summation of the value of the two cohorts.  And since the total number of 
the two cohorts is a constant and the margin of each customer in both cohorts is equal, the 
goal of maximizing portfolio’s value can be achieved by minimizing the summation of 
two cohorts’ costs, which is the summation of total acquisition cost and retention cost 
(this will be the objective function).  
 
LTV model (Gupta, 2003) vs. CPV in this study 
 
As the mathematical proof shows, with the assumptions of the “Constant margin of a 
customer” and “Constant retention rate”, a customer’s LTV (life-time value) can be 
represented by a CPV (current period value) scaled by a constant.  The CPV of the 
portfolio in the base model of this study is CPV (M,A,R), which is the CPV calculated 
based on profit margin, acquisition cost, and retention cost.  And because of the 
assumption of “Equal margin of customers in the base model”, and the assumption of 
fixed number of total customers in the portfolio, the income of the portfolio is a constant.  
The only factors that will vary are the costs of acquisition and retention.   
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Therefore, when the total cost of acquisition and retention is minimized, as it is achieved 
in the current study, the CPV (current period value) of the portfolio of the customers is 
maximized.  Consequently, the LTV is maximized.  This is how this study is consistent 
with typical LTV models.   
 
Key differences between Gupta’s LTV and my CPV and how they reconcile 
 
 Time period Unit Optimization 
LTV 
(Life time value) 
Multiple period Multiple Cohorts at 
various stages of 
“degeneration”  
Maximize  
Income minus costs 
CPV 
(Current period 
value) 
Single period Two cohorts: acquired 
and retained 
 
Minimize costs 
Reconcile under the 
condition of  
Assumptions of 
Constant margin 
and Constant 
retention rate 
Single period Assumption of 
Equal margin and 
Fixed number of 
customers 
 
Summary 
The objective function of the study will be to maximize life-time value (LTV) of the 
portfolio. 
 
For the base model, with the assumptions listed above 
Maximize LTV of the portfolio 
= Maximize the sum of cohort of the acquired and the cohort of the retained (Standard 
LTV definition) 
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=Maximized the CPV of the two cohorts (see proof of multi-period to single period 
equivalency, with the assumption of constant margin and constant retention) 
=Minimize sum of (acquisition cost + retention cost) (with the assumptions of equal 
margin and fixed number of customers) 
 
Therefore, the objective function is reduced to minimizing the total acquisition and 
retention costs.  Because of the mathematical equivalency proved above, the conclusion 
drawn from this analysis will be valid under LTV criterion. 
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